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1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance programs in most Western countries follow a common design. The
beneﬁts are set at a constant replacement rate for a ﬁxed period, typically followed by lower
beneﬁts under unemployment assistance. In such systems, the hazard rate from unemployment
typically declines from an initial peak the longer workers are unemployed, surges at unemploy-
ment exhaustion, and declines thereafter. This has been shown in a variety of settings, such
as in the United States (Katz and Meyer, 1990), Hungary (Micklewright and Nagy, 1999),
Austria (Card et al., 2007a), Slovenia (van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008), Germany (Schmieder
et al., 2012a), and France (Le Barbanchon, 2012).
It is well-known that a basic job search model a la Mortensen (1986) and van den Berg
(1990) is unable to match this pattern. This model predicts an increasing exit hazard up
until beneﬁt expiration, with a constant exit rate thereafter. To match the time path, job
search models add unobserved heterogeneity among workers. More productive workers are
more likely to ﬁnd a job initially, leading to a decrease in the hazard over time as the workers
still unemployed are predominantly of the less productive type.
In this paper, we propose, and test, a behavioral model of job search which can account
for this time path of unemployment even in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. Namely,
we incorporate one of the best established facts in psychology, that people’s perceptions and
decisions are inﬂuenced by relative comparisons. We assume that workers have reference-
dependent preferences over their utility from consumption. As in prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), workers are loss-averse with respect to consumption below a reference
point. Further, we assume that this reference point is given by recent earnings.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a reference-dependent worker who was just laid oﬀ and assume,
for now, hand-to-mouth consumption. At the time of job loss, the reference point of the
unemployed is the previous wage, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the unemployment beneﬁt,
the new consumption level. The unemployed, therefore, ﬁnds the new state of unemployment
particularly painful given the loss relative to the reference point, and so she searches hard at
the beginning of a UI spell. Over the weeks of unemployment, however, the reference point
shifts as the individual adapts to the lower beneﬁt level, and the loss is thus mitigated. Hence,
the worker’s search eﬀort decreases. As the end of the UI beneﬁts draws near, the worker, if
still unemployed, anticipates the loss in consumption due to the exhaustion of the beneﬁts,
and searches harder. This force is at work also in the standard model, but it is heightened
by the anticipation of the future loss aversion. If the worker does not ﬁnd a job by the UI
expiration, the worker once again slowly adjusts to the new, lower beneﬁt level.
The hazard from unemployment for this reference-dependent worker decreases from the ini-
tial peak, increases at exhaustion, then decreases again. Hence, the predicted hazard matches
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the patterns documented above, even in absence of unobserved heterogeneity.
How would one distinguish the standard job search model from a reference-dependent
model? Consider two UI systems, the ﬁrst oﬀering a constant beneﬁt path until period T ,
with the second oﬀering higher initial beneﬁts up to period T1 < T but lower beneﬁts between
T1 and T (Figure 1a). The two systems have the same welfare beneﬁt level after period T .
The standard model with no heterogeneity predicts that, starting from period T, the hazard
rate in the two systems would be the same, as the future payoﬀs are identical (Figure 1b).
Furthermore, the hazard rate in the periods right before period T will be higher in the system
with two-step beneﬁts given the lower beneﬁts at that point.
The reference-dependent model makes three diﬀerent predictions (Figure 1c). First, right
after period T the hazard in the one-step system would be higher because of the higher loss
in consumption compared to the recent beneﬁts. Second, this diﬀerence would attenuate over
time and ultimately disappear as the reference point adjusts to the lower beneﬁt level. Third,
the hazard rate in the ﬁrst UI system increases already in advance of period T, in anticipation
of the future loss aversion. Notice that, while these predictions are developed in the absence
of heterogeneity to highlight the intuition, we fully integrate heterogeneity in our estimates.
We evaluate a change in the Hungarian unemployment insurance system which is ideally
suited for a test of the above predictions. Before November 2005, the Hungarian system
featured a constant replacement rate for 270 days, followed by lower unemployment assistance
beneﬁts. After November 2005, the system changed to a two-step unemployment system:
beneﬁts are higher in the ﬁrst 90 days, but lower between days 90 and 270, compared to the
pre-period (Figure A-1). There was no major change in the unemployment assistance system
taking place after 270 days. As such, this UI set-up corresponds to the hypothetical case
outlined above with period T corresponding to 270 days.
An important feature of the Hungarian reform is that the total beneﬁts paid out until day
270 remain about the same after the reform. Hence, diﬀerences in savings and in selection in
the pre- and post- period are likely to be small, allowing for a more straightforward comparison.
We evaluate the reform by comparing the hazard rates into employment in the year before
and after the reform. The evidence is well in line with the predictions of the reference-
dependent model. In the weeks immediately preceding the 270-day exhaustion of beneﬁts, the
pre-reform hazard rates rise above the post-reform hazard rates. In the months following the
exhaustion, the pre-reform hazard rates remain higher, and they ultimately converge to the
post-reform level only after a couple months. The observed pattern around the exhaustion is
consistent with the anticipation of, and then the direct eﬀect of the higher loss in consumption
for individuals in the pre-reform. The ultimate convergence between the two hazards indicates,
in this interpretation, the timing of the reference point adjustment.
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We present several robustness checks. Controlling for a broad set of controls and alternative
deﬁnitions of our sample barely aﬀects the estimated hazards. Also, an interrupted time series
analysis shows that the break in the hazards occurs immediately in the quarter of introduction
of the reform, and does not appear to reﬂect previous trends.
While the evidence is qualitatively consistent with predictions of the reference-dependent
model, it is important to compare the quantitative ﬁt of the behavioral model with the ﬁt of
the standard model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. To do so, we structurally estimate
a model with optimal search eﬀort, log utility, and unobserved heterogeneity in the form of
types of individuals with diﬀerent search costs.1 Given that the reference-dependent model has
two extra parameters (loss-aversion and updating horizon for the reference point), we allow
for one less cost type, two versus three in the standard model, thus equating the number of
estimated parameters. We estimate the model with a minimum-distance estimator, matching
the empirical hazard rates in the pre- and post-reform to the predictions of the model.
The preferred estimate for the standard model does a relatively good job of ﬁtting the
hazards in the ﬁrst 200 days. More speciﬁcally, the presence of heterogeneous types allows
to qualitatively match the spike in the hazard at 90 days post-reform. The standard model,
however, is unable to capture the observed behavior leading up to, and following, the exhaus-
tion of beneﬁts. In particular, the hazard rates from day 270 on in the pre- and post-period
are predicted to be almost identical, contrary to the empirical ﬁndings.
The reference-dependent model captures the spike at 90 days and the subsequent decrease,
similar to the standard model (and with a closer ﬁt). Importantly, this behavioral model also
captures key features of the data which the standard model does not ﬁt: the increase in
hazard in the month prior to the expiration of beneﬁts in the pre-period, the spike at 270
days, the decrease thereafter, and the ultimate convergence of the hazard between the pre-
and post-period after a few months. The ﬁt of the model is by no means perfect: the model
underpredicts the spike at 270 days and the diﬀerence in hazards in the following two months.
Still, it captures most of the qualitative features which the standard model does not ﬁt at all.
An important caveat is that these estimates assume hand-to-mouth consumers. However,
reference-dependent workers should build precautionary savings to smooth the upcoming loss
utility due to a beneﬁt decrease, eliminating the elevated hazards at beneﬁt exhaustion. Thus,
the good ﬁt of the reference-dependent model may depend crucially on an ad hoc assumption.
To address this concern, in our benchmark estimates we incorporate a consumption-savings
decision and estimate time preferences in addition to job search parameters.
The results point to an important interaction between reference dependence and impa-
tience. As the intuition above suggested, the reference-dependent model with optimal con-
1For tractability, the model does not allow for a reservation wage choice, a restriction we revisit later.
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sumption does not provide a good ﬁt for the data if we impose high degrees of patience. Once
we allow for estimated discount rates, however, the reference-dependent model ﬁts the data
well, as in the hand-to-mouth estimates. The point estimates indicate a signiﬁcant weight
on gain-loss utility, slow updating of the reference point, and high impatience. The stan-
dard model, with similarly high estimated impatience, ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly worse than
the reference-dependent model and in fact somewhat worse than the hand-to-mouth stan-
dard model.2 Thus, the estimates with optimal consumption conﬁrm the better ﬁt of the
reference-dependent model, and additionally point to the role of impatience.
But are these estimates plausible? The estimate for loss aversion is in the range of the
previous literature, but the estimated discount factor is arguably implausibly small at 0.9 for
a 15-day period, leading to an annual discount factor of 0.08 (The estimated discount factor
for the standard model is similarly small). What appears to be extreme impatience may,
however, reﬂect mis-speciﬁed time preferences. Building on evidence in a large number of
settings, including job search (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005), we allow for present-biased
time preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), with an additional discount
factor β between the current period and the future.
The estimates allowing for present bias do as well (in fact, attain a better ﬁt) as the
estimates with exponential discounting, but imply much more reasonable discounting. We
estimate a present-bias parameter β=0.58, well within the range of estimates in the literature,
for an implied annual discount factor of 0.52 for the ﬁrst year and 0.88 for later years. The
ﬁt of standard model instead does not improve if we allow for present-bias preferences. Thus,
the evidence appears to point, not just to reference dependence, but also to impatience and
likely present-bias among unemployed workers.
We then examine further the components of the reference-dependent model. The results do
not depend on unobserved heterogeneity: a reference-dependent model with no heterogeneity
provides nearly as good a ﬁt. The results also do not depend on the exact reference-point
updating rule, as the ﬁt is similar with an alternative AR(1) updating assumption. Further,
the ﬁt does not depend on allowing for gain utility (achieved at reemployment). What is
critical for the results, as expected, is that loss aversion experienced as income decreases.
How does reference dependence compare to habit formation? Models a la Constantinides
(1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999), like the reference-dependent model, induce a
temporarily higher marginal utility of income following a beneﬁt cut as consumption gets
closer to the habit. Thus, they could plausibly ﬁt the patterns in the data. We highlight
2In the hand-to-mouth case, the best ﬁt for the standard model is for a relatively high degree of patience.
Yet, for such level of patience, the workers should not go hand-to-mouth. Once we endogenize consumption,
such estimates with high patience are not optimal any more, given that they would lead the workers to save
and thus smooth the beneﬁt jumps more than observed in the data. Thus, endogenizing the consumption
decision is an important check for the ability of the standard model to ﬁt the observed patterns.
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a key diﬀerence. In the reference-dependent model, the impact of the loss on search eﬀort
is approximately proportional to the size of the loss. Instead, in the habit-formation model
larger decreases in consumption have disproportionate eﬀects. Given this, the habit-formation
model underpredicts the spike in hazard at 270 days, since the beneﬁt step-down at 90 days
is proportionally larger. We also estimate habit-formation models with multiplicative habits
(e.g. Abel, 1990) that are equivalent to reference-dependent models with no loss aversion.
These models provide a better ﬁt than the standard model, though not quite as good as the
reference-dependent model, conﬁrming the role of loss aversion in our estimates.
Could alternative versions of the standard model ﬁt the data as well as the reference-
dependent model? We allow for, among other assumptions, diﬀerent starting assets, back-
ground consumption, time-varying search costs, and a delay between search eﬀort and the
jobs start. We also estimate the model using diﬀerent weights, using probability of exit in-
stead of hazard, and excluding the spikes from the moments. None of these changes sizeably
aﬀect the ﬁt of the standard model, or of the reference-dependent model.
We then examine alternative forms of unobserved heterogeneity. While in the benchmark
estimates we assume heterogeneity in search cost in the spirit of Paserman (2008), we allow
for more cost types, for heterogeneity in re-employment wage, or in the search elasticity with
respect to the returns to search. The ﬁrst two forms of heterogeneity do not close the gap with
the reference-dependent model, but the model with heterogeneous search elasticity ﬁts much
better, even outperforming the reference-dependent model. This model explains the observed
spikes by allowing for a type with such high search elasticity (over 50) that only searches once
beneﬁts fall below a threshold.
But is the model with heterogeneous search elasticity plausible? We provide two implica-
tions and two additional pieces of evidence which, in our view, cast doubt on it. First, this
model ﬁts the data well only for very high elasticities; if we restrict the elasticities to be no
higher than 5 (already quite high), the ﬁt does not come close to matching the reference-
dependent model. Second, given the high elasticities, the model makes the unlikely prediction
that, if welfare beneﬁts were lowered, or increased, by just 10 percent, search eﬀort would
skyrocket, or conversely go to zero.
Further, we examine an earlier UI reform which lengthens the duration of unemployment
assistance. The impact of the reform on the hazard path is very limited, mostly shifting the
spike, consistent with out-of-sample predictions for the reference-dependent model. Instead,
the model with heterogeneous cost elasticity predicts a substantial dip in the hazards.
We also compare the dynamic selection implied by the estimated models to the selection on
observables in the data. We show that the selection implied by the standard model diﬀers both
qualitatively and quantitatively from the observed selection; instead, the implied selection is
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close to the observed selection for the reference-dependent model.
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss other job search models which we do not estimate but which
could potentially explain some of the ﬁndings. A model of storable oﬀers (as in Boone and van
Ours 2012) could explain the spike in hazard at beneﬁt exhaustion, but not the pattern of the
hazards in the following months. A model of skill depreciation or screening (e.g. Schmieder
et al., 2016) can explain decreasing hazards over the spell, but such decrease would plausibly
be the same pre- and post-reform. Two classes of models which could potentially explain the
ﬁndings are worker learning and consumption commitments (Chetty, 2003 and Chetty and
Szeidl, 2016). A worker may learn over time that ﬁnding jobs is harder than expected, and this
learning may take place later in the pre-reform period, given the diﬀerent beneﬁt structure.
A worker with committed consumption would increase search eﬀort to avoid paying a ﬁxed
cost of adjustment; if despite this, she does not ﬁnd a job soon enough, she will pay the cost
and then decrease search. These dynamics could generate some of the hazard patterns after
day 270. While both models have intuitive features, unfortunately neither is tractable enough
to estimate on our sample.3 For tractability reasons, we also do not estimate models with
reservation wage choice and optimal consumption-savings.4
To sum up, reference dependence, in combination with impatience, can help explain pat-
terns in job search that are hard to rationalize with most alternative models, even allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity. These results have implications for potential redesigns of un-
employment insurance policies, a point to which we return brieﬂy in the conclusions.
The paper relates to the literature on unemployment insurance design (e.g. Chetty, 2008;
Kroft and Notowidigdo, forthcoming; Schmieder et al., 2012a). Within this literature, we
evaluate a unique reform: changing the time path of the beneﬁt schedule, keeping the overall
payments approximately constant. The paper is consistent with recent evidence of sharp con-
sumption drops at unemployment entry and UI exhaustion for unemployed workers (Ganong
and Noel, 2015; Kolsrud et al., 2015), suggesting approximate hand-to-mouth behavior.
The paper also contributes to a literature on behavioral labor economics, including work
on employer-employee gift exchange (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1993; Gneezy and List, 2006),
horizontal pay equity (Card et al., 2012; Breza et al., 2015), and target earnings in labor sup-
ply (Camerer et al., 1997; Farber, 2015). Within job search, DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)
consider the impact of present-bias while Spinnewijn (2013) examines the role of overconﬁ-
dence. We show that a reference-dependent model of job search makes unique predictions,
3The consumption commitment model requires to keep track of a ﬁxed cost decision, making the model
cumbersome to estimate. To address this issue, Chetty (2003) makes the timing of ﬁxed cost payment ex-
ogenous. A consumption commitment model with exogenous consumption readjustment, as in Chetty (2003),
would not explain our ﬁndings.
4We present in the appendix estimates with reservation wage choice for the hand-to-mouth case. The
results should be considered only suggestive, as endogenizing consumption is very important.
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and that the data points to a combination of reference dependence and present bias.5
The paper also adds to the evidence on reference dependence from settings including
insurance choice (Sydnor, 2010; Barseghyan et al., 2013), labor supply (Fehr and Goette,
2007; Farber, 2015), domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011), goal setting (Allen et al.,
forthcoming), and tax elusion (Engström et al., 2015; Rees-Jones, 2013). Across these settings,
the reference point is the status-quo, or the forward-looking expectation (Kőszegi and Rabin,
2006). We estimate the speed of updating of a backward-looking reference point as in Bowman
et al. (1999), similar to Post et al. (2008). This paper is also part of a literature on structural
behavioral economics (Laibson et al., 2007; Conlin et al., 2007; DellaVigna et al., 2012).
The papers proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a model of job search and reference
dependence. In Section 3 we present the institutional details and the data for the Hungary
unemployment insurance reform, which we evaluate in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the
structural estimates, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Model
In this section we present a discrete-time model of job search with reference-dependent prefer-
ences and present-biased preferences. We build on the job search intensity model presented in
Card et al. (2007a) and in Lentz and Tranaes (2005) by adding a reference dependent utility
function in consumption with a backward looking reference point.
Model Setup. As in Card et al. (2007a) we make two simplifying assumptions. First, jobs
last indeﬁnitely once found. Second, wages are exogenously ﬁxed, eliminating reservation-wage
choices. Each period a job seeker decides search eﬀort st ∈ [0, 1], representing the probability
of receiving a job oﬀer at the end of period t and thus of being employed in period t + 1.
Search costs are given by the function c(st), which we assume to be time-separable, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and convex, with c (0) = 0 and c′ (0) = 0.
In each period individuals receive income yt, either UI beneﬁts bt or wage wt, and consume
ct. In the general model consumers smooth consumption over time by accumulating (or
running down) assets At. Assets earn a return R per period so that consumers face a per-
period budget constraint At+1
1+R
= At + yt − ct and a borrowing constraint At ≥ −L. We also
consider a simpliﬁed model with hand-to-mouth consumption, ct = yt.
The direct utility from consumption in period t for an unemployed person is v (ct), where
v(.) is an increasing and concave function. The novel aspect is the fact that the reference-
dependent individual has, in addition to consumption utility v (ct), also gain-loss utility. Fol-
5Koenig et al. (2016) model a reference-dependent reservation wage choice in that the wage oﬀers with
some probability equal a previous wage (the reference). Their paper focuses on job matches and reservation
wages, as opposed to on the dynamics of exit from unemployment.
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lowing the functional form of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), ﬂow utility in each period is
u (ct|rt) =
v (ct) + η [v (ct)− v (rt)] if ct ≥ rt
v (ct) + ηλ [v (ct)− v (rt)] if ct < rt
(1)
where rt denotes the reference point in period t. The utility consists of consumption utility
v (ct) and gain-loss utility v (ct) − v (rt). When consumption is above the reference point
(ct ≥ rt), the individual derives gain utility v (ct) − v (rt) > 0, which receives weight η.
When consumption is below the reference point (ct < rt), the individual derives loss utility
v (ct)− v (rt) < 0, with weight λη. The parameter λ ≥ 1 captures loss aversion: the marginal
utility is higher for losses than for gains. This reference-dependent utility function builds on
prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979) without, for simplicity, modelling diminishing
sensitivity or probability weighting. The standard model is a special case for η = 0.
The second key assumption is the determination of the reference point rt. Unlike in the
literature on forward-looking reference points (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006), but in the spirit of
the tradition on backward-looking reference points (Bowman et al., 1999), the reference point
is the average of income over the N previous periods:6
rt =
1
N + 1
t∑
k=t−N
yk
To gain perspective on the impact of reference dependence, consider an individual in
steady state with consumption, income, and reference point equal to y. Then in period T,
consider a small, permanent decrease in income from y to y − ∆y < y, and an identical
decrease in consumption from c = y to y −∆y.7 In period T , utility changes to v (y −∆y) +
ηλ [v (y −∆y)− v (y)] . The short-term change in utility equals, up to a linear approximation,
− (1 + ηλ)∆y ∗ v′ (y) . Over time, however, the reference point adjusts to y −∆y so that the
utility after N periods is v (y −∆y) . Hence, the long-term change in utility equals −∆yv′ (y).
Thus, ηλ captures the weight on additional short-term utility in response to an income loss.
Value Functions. The unemployed choose search eﬀort st and consumption ct in each
period and face the following value function, where δ is the discount factor:
V Ut (At) = max
st∈[0,1];At+1
u (ct|rt)− c (st) + δ
[
stV
E
t+1|t+1 (At+1) + (1− st)V
U
t+1 (At+1)
]
(2)
6Notice that if N = 0, then rt = bt. In the hand-to-mouth case, where ct = yt, the reference-dependent
utility then simpliﬁes to the direct-consumption utility, u (ct|rt) = v(ct) and therefore the standard model is
embedded. For the model with optimal consumption, even setting N = 0 the standard model is not embedded.
In the estimation below we also consider an alternative AR(1) reference point formation process.
7A sudden permanent drop in consumption could occur, for example, if the individual is a hand-to-mouth
consumer and beneﬁts suddenly drop.
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subject to: ct = At + yt −
At+1
1 +R
.
The assumption that the reference point is function of past income and not of past con-
sumption simpliﬁes the value functions substantially, since the value function of unemployment
depends only on assets At: V
U
t (At). For the employed, the reference point depends also on for
how long the person has been employed; hence, the value function can be written as V Et|j(At)
for an individual who is employed in period t and who found a job in period j. Note also the
assumptions on timing: the job-seeker chooses search eﬀort st in period t; with probability st
a job oﬀer materializes, in which case the individual earns wage w starting in period t+ 1.
Once an individual ﬁnds a job at time j, the value of employment in period t is given by:
V Et|j (At) = max
ct>0
u (ct|rt) + δV
E
t+1|j (At+1) . (3)
Given Equation (2) the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal level of search eﬀort s∗t in the
case of an interior solution can be written as:
c′ (s∗t (At+1)) = δ
[
V Et+1|t+1 (At+1)− V
U
t+1 (At+1)
]
. (4)
Thus we can rewrite the unemployed problem as:
V Ut (At) = max
At+1
u
(
At + yt −
At+1
1 +R
∣∣∣∣ rt
)
− c (s∗t (At+1))
+δ
[
s∗t (At+1)V
E
t+1|t+1 (At+1) + (1− s
∗
t (At+1))V
U
t+1 (At+1)
]
We solve the model by backwards induction, deriving ﬁrst the steady-state optimal con-
sumption in the employed state. This allows us to solve for the optimal consumption path
for each asset level and to obtain the value functions V Et|t (At) for each t and each asset level
At. Then we solve the dynamic programming problem for the unemployed, moving backwards
from the steady state, solving for the optimal consumption path and search eﬀort path for
each possible starting value of the asset vector.
Front-Loading The Benefit Path. To highlight the implications of reference depen-
dence, we consider a hypothetical unemployment insurance reform that closely corresponds
to our empirical setting. To build intuition and for tractability, we consider in detail the case
of hand-to-mouth consumers with no heterogeneity and then brieﬂy discuss the extension to
the general case. In the case of hand-to-mouth consumers, assets are not a control variable
and thus we can solve for s∗t : s
∗
t = C
(
δ
[
V Et+1|t+1 − V
U
t+1
])
,where C(.) = c′−1(.).
Consider a UI system with beneﬁts b1 for the ﬁrst T1 periods beneﬁts and beneﬁts b2 from
period T1 until T . After period T , there is a lower second tier (such as social assistance) with
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beneﬁts b. A single-step UI system, like the one in the US, is captured by b1 = b2 = bconstant
and is illustrated by the blue solid line in Figure 1a).
Consider a reform that front-loads the beneﬁt path by raising beneﬁts b1 in the ﬁrst
T1 periods and reducing beneﬁts b2 in periods T1 to T , while leaving second-tier beneﬁts b
unchanged, as illustrated by the red dashed line in Figure 1a). Furthermore, the reform leaves
untouched the total amount of beneﬁts paid to an individual unemployed for T periods:
b1T1 + b2(T − T1) = bconstantT. (5)
Equation (5) implies ∂b2
∂b1
= − T1
T−T1
. We now partially characterize how search s∗t is aﬀected
by an increase in b1 subject to constraint (5). We express the results in terms of
ds∗t
db1
=
∂s∗t
∂b1
− T1
T−T1
∂s∗t
∂b2
, where the total derivative takes the implied adjustment of b2 into account.
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Proposition 1. Assume a hand-to-mouth unemployed job-seeker and consider a shift in the
benefit path that front-loads the benefits b1 keeping the overall benefits paid constant.
a) In the standard model (η = 0), the search effort in all periods after benefit expiration at
T is unaffected:
ds∗
T+i
db1
= 0, for i = 0, 1, ....
b) In the reference-dependent model (η > 0 and λ ≥ 1) search effort (weakly) decreases in
the first N periods after T, and remains constant in later periods:
ds∗
T+i
db1
≤ 0, for i = 0, 1, ...N−1
and
ds∗
T+i
db1
= 0, for i = N,N + 1, ... Furthermore, if the adjustment speed N of the reference
point is shorter than T , then the inequality is strict:
ds∗
T+i
db1
< 0, for i = 0, 1, ...N − 1
Part a) is straightforward. In the standard model, the search decision depends exclusively
on future beneﬁts and wages, and the reform leaves unaﬀected the beneﬁts past period T.
The intuition for part b), which we prove in the appendix, is as follows. An increase in
b1 aﬀects search eﬀort in period T through changes in V
E
T+1 and V
U
T+1. These value functions
are aﬀected because frontloading the beneﬁt path (increasing b1 and reducing b2) will reduce
the reference point at time T , rT , as long as N < T . This will increase both the value of
employment (due to an increase in gain utility) and the value of unemployment (due to a
decrease in loss utility). If λ ≥ 1 the decrease in loss utility will be larger than the increase
in gain utility, leading to a reduction in search eﬀort.
These predictions are illustrated in Figures 1b) and c). In the standard model (Figure 1b),
optimal search eﬀort increases under both regimes up until period T, and then plateaus after
period T at a level that is unaﬀected by the front-loading of beneﬁts (Proposition 1a). Gener-
ally, the hazard rate for the front-loaded regime (the dotted red line) will be higher than the
one for constant beneﬁts in the periods right before period T, given the moral hazard.
8Note that search eﬀort in period t is not aﬀected by UI beneﬁts in period t, since the individual will
only start a job found in period t in period t + 1. Thus search eﬀort st corresponds to the exit hazard from
unemployment in period t+ 1: st = ht+1.
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In contrast, under reference dependence (Figure 1c), search eﬀort in period T is substan-
tially higher under the constant-beneﬁt regime (continuous blue line). Individuals in this
regime experience a sharper drop in consumption and thus (for N < T ) signiﬁcant loss utility
due to the higher reference point. Second, the diﬀerence in hazards persists but shrinks for
N periods, at which point the reference point has fully adapted to the lower beneﬁts under
either regime, and thus search eﬀort converges. A third implication (not captured in the
Proposition) is that in the last few periods before period T , for suﬃciently large loss aver-
sion λ, the hazard is higher under the constant-beneﬁt regime compared to the front-loaded
regime. The anticipation of larger future losses under the constant-beneﬁts regime generates
this anticipatory eﬀect, counteracting the moral hazard eﬀect of more generous beneﬁts.
Notice that Proposition 1 does not hold with either heterogeneity or optimal consumption.
With heterogeneous types, diﬀerences in the path of beneﬁts up to period T may lead to a
diﬀerent composition of types surviving at period T, and thus diﬀerences in the hazard even
in the standard model, violating Proposition 1a). However, given the assumption of constant
total beneﬁt payout, diﬀerences in type composition are likely to be small.
Introducing savings in the model also invalidates Proposition 1 since individuals may have
diﬀerent savings at period T , thus creating diﬀerences in hazards, even under the standard
model. However, given that the total beneﬁt payments are constant, such diﬀerences in savings
are likely to be small. We address both heterogeneity and savings in the estimation section.
Present Bias. We extend the model by allowing for present-bias (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999), with an additional discount factor β ≤ 1 between the current period and
the future. The present bias factor β induces time inconsistency and ﬁts behavior in a range of
settings (see Frederick et al., 2002; DellaVigna, 2009). In the context of job search, DellaVigna
and Paserman (2005) solve for a job search model with present-biased preferences. We assume
that individuals are naive about their future present-bias: they (wrongly) assume that in the
future they will make decisions based on regular discounting δ. We make this assumption
mostly for computational reasons, since the naive agent problem can be solved using the value
functions of the exponential agent (given that the naive worker believes she will be exponen-
tial from next period). In addition, the evidence on present bias is largely consistent with the
naivete’ assumption (DellaVigna, 2009).
The naive hyperbolic discounting individual solves the following value functions:
V U,nt (At) = max
st∈[0,1];At+1
u (ct|rt)− c (st) + βδ
[
stV
E
t+1|t+1 (At+1) + (1− st)V
U
t+1 (At+1)
]
(6)
subject to: ct = At + yt −
At+1
1 +R
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and
V E,nt+1|t+1 (At+1) = maxct>0
u (ct|rt) + βδV
E
t+2|t+1 (At+1) (7)
where the functions V Ut+1 and V
E
t+1|t+1 are given by equations (2) and (3) above for the ex-
ponential discounters. Note that this adds one more step to the solution algorithms, since
we ﬁrst solve for all possible values of V Ut+1 and V
E,n
t+1|t+1 and then we solve for the optimal
consumption and search paths given by V U,nt+1 and V
E,n
t+1|t+1.
3 Data and Institutions
3.1 Unemployment Insurance in Hungary
Hungary had a generous two-tier unemployment insurance system up to 2005. In the ﬁrst tier,
potential duration and beneﬁt amount depended on past UI contribution.9 The maximum
potential duration, obtained after around 4 years of contribution, was 270 days,10 while the
beneﬁt level was based on the earnings in the previous year. After the exhaustion of ﬁrst-tier
beneﬁts, unemployment assistance (UA) beneﬁts could be claimed in the second tier. The UA
beneﬁt amount was the same for everybody, with the potential duration depending on age.
On May 30th, 2005 the Hungarian government announced a comprehensive reform of the
UI system11, with the goal of speeding up transition from unemployment to employment. The
government changed the beneﬁt calculations formula in the ﬁrst tier, but did not alter the way
potential duration and the earnings base were calculated. Before the reform, the beneﬁt in
the ﬁrst tier was constant with a replacement rate of 65% and with minimum and maximum
beneﬁt caps. The reform introduced a two-step beneﬁt system. For the ﬁrst step, the length
was half of the potential duration in the ﬁrst tier, and at most 91 days, and the replacement
was lowered to 60% with increased minimum and maximum beneﬁt caps. For most claimants
these changes meant lower beneﬁts than under the old schedule. In the second tier everybody
received the new minimum beneﬁt amount, reducing beneﬁts for most claimants compared to
before. The beneﬁt formula changes are summarized in Appendix Figure A-1.
The most prominent change occurred for those with 270 days of eligibility (four years of
UI contributions before lay-oﬀ) and base year earnings above the new beneﬁt cap (that is,
they earned more than 114,000HUF ($570) per month in 2005). As Figure 2 shows, for this
group the duration of beneﬁts in the ﬁrst tier remains 270 days. While in the old system the
9Every worker in the formal sector must pay a UI contribution. In 2005, employers contributed 3% to the
UI fund, while employees 1%. There is no experience rating of UI beneﬁts in Hungary.
10More speciﬁcally, potential beneﬁt in the ﬁrst tier was calculated as UI contribution days in the last 4
years divided by 5, but at most 270 days.
11The reform was part of a wider government program called “100 steps”. Policies related to the labor
market and unemployment insurance (such as reemployment bonus and training policies) are discussed later.
In addition to that, VAT and corporate income tax were decreased from January 1st 2006.
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beneﬁts were constant in the ﬁrst tier, under the new rules beneﬁts increased substantially
in the ﬁrst 90 days, but decreased afterwards. An important feature of the reform for this
group is that the increase in weekly beneﬁts in the ﬁrst 90 days is about twice as large as
the decrease in weekly beneﬁt between 90 and 270 days, keeping the total beneﬁt pay-out for
individuals unemployed for 270 days the same.
Even though the main element of the reform was the new beneﬁt formula, there were
other changes occurring at the same time. Most notably, a reemployment bonus scheme
was introduced with a bonus amount equal to 50% of the remaining total ﬁrst-tier beneﬁts.
However, claiming the bonus was not without costs. If the bonus was claimed, then the
entitlement for the unused beneﬁt days was nulled. This could be very costly for risk-averse
agents or for those who could only ﬁnd an insecure job. Also, the bonus could only be claimed
after the date of ﬁrst-tier beneﬁt exhaustion. This meant hassle costs, since UI claimants had
to show up and ﬁll out the paper work in the local UI oﬃce. Given these costs, it is not
surprising that the take-up rate of reemployment bonus was only 6%, making it unlikely that
it had substantial eﬀects. As a robustness check, we show that the results are not sensitive to
dropping the reemployment bonus users from the sample.12
In addition to the introduction of the reemployment bonus, there were two other minor
relevant changes. First, those who claimed UI beneﬁt before February 5th, 2005 faced a longer
13, but somewhat lower, beneﬁt in the second tier.14 To avoid this complication, we only focus
on those who claimed their beneﬁts after February 5th, 2005. Second, there were minor
changes in ﬁnancing training programs.15 However, participation in training programs was
very low (less than 5%) in our sample and our results are robust to dropping these claimants.
Those who exhausted beneﬁts in both tiers (UI and UA) and were still unemployed could
claim means-tested social assistance. The duration of social assistance is indeﬁnite, while the
amount depends on family size, family income, and wealth. In most cases social assistance
12Lindner and Reizer (2015) investigate the reemployment bonus in detail and further show that it does not
aﬀect the unemployment duration.
13Before the reform, the potential duration in the second tier was 270 days above age 45 and 180 days below
45. Those who claimed UI after February 5th, 2005 were eligible for 180 days above age 50 and 90 days below
50 in the second tier.
14The change in the duration and beneﬁt level in the second tier was introduced at November 1st, 2005
at the same time as other changes. However, it aﬀected everybody who claimed second tier (UA) beneﬁts
after November 1st, 2005. A UI claimant who claimed her beneﬁts after February 5th, 2005 and had 270 days
potential eligibility could only claim second tier beneﬁts (UA) after November 1st, 2005. Therefore, claimants
between February 5th, 2005 and November 1st, 2005 are under the old beneﬁt system for the ﬁrst tier, but
face the same second tier (UA) insurance scheme, see Figure 3.
15Unemployed participating in training programs received the so-called income substituting beneﬁt. Be-
fore November 1st, 2005 this amount was 22,200HUF ($111) or 44,400HUF ($222), depending on household
characteristics and type of training. This beneﬁt was payed in excess of the UI. After November 1st, the
beneﬁt was 34,200HUF ($171) for everybody, but the UI beneﬁt was suspended during training. Although
we only observe training participation after November 1st, 2005, aggregate data show that the probability of
participation in training programs remained constant throughout this period Frey (2009).
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beneﬁts are lower than the second tier UI beneﬁt level.16
3.2 Data
We use administrative data17 on social security contributions for roughly 4 million individuals
between January 2002 and December 2008. The sample consists of a 50% de facto random
sample of all Hungarian citizens who were older than 14 and younger than 75 in 2002.18 The
data contains information on UI claims from February 2004 to December 2008 as well as basic
information used by the National Employment Service, like the starting and ending date of
the UI beneﬁt spells and the earnings base used for beneﬁt calculation.
In this paper we only focus on UI claimants who are eligible for the maximum potential
duration (270 days) in the ﬁrst tier. In addition, we restrict our sample to those who are
older than 25 years and younger than 49 years, since speciﬁc rules apply close to retirement.
Moreover, we identify as our main sample UI claimants with high earnings base, since our goal
is to explore the variation in Figure 2. To construct a consistent sample over time, we focus
on the unemployed with earnings base above the 70th percentile among the UI claimants in a
given year. In 2005, a UI claimant at the 70th percentile earned 100,800 HUF ($504).19
To evaluate the reform, we construct two comparison groups of workers who entered UI
just before or just after the reform, since the claiming date determined the relevant regime.
Due to the change in unemployment assistance in February 2005, we use all UI claimants
between February 5th, 2005 and October 15, 2005 (to avoid getting too close to the reform)
as our pre-reform group. For the post-reform group, we take UI entrants in the same date
range (February 5 to October 15) in 2006 so as to match possible seasonal patterns. Figure 3
shows the timing of the two comparison groups and the range for which our data is available.
For robustness checks, we later show results using data in the earlier and later ranges as well.
Table 1 shows basic descriptives for the two groups. The basic demographic characteristics,
such as age at time of claiming, education and log earnings in the years 2002 - 2004, are similar
before and after the reform. The waiting period (the number of days between job loss and the
time of claiming UI beneﬁts) is almost identical across the two groups, indicating that people
towards the end of our before sample were not trying to delay UI claiming dates in order to
become eligible to the new regime.20 The take-up rates of the reemployment bonus scheme,
16For large families, social assistance can be more generous than UI. However, social assistance cannot be
claimed before all other beneﬁts have been exhausted in the UI system.
17The dataset is provided by the Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
18More precisely the sample is composed of everybody born on the 1st of January, 1927, and every second
day thereafter (3rd of January, 5th of January etc.).
19Our results are robust to alternative earnings thresholds over time. For example, we estimated our main
speciﬁcations for those whose (real) earnings base was above 114,000 HUF ($570) and obtained virtually the
same results.
20Appendix Figure A-2 shows the unemployment rate and GDP growth rate around the two periods in
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which was introduced in 2005, are quite low. Below we present robustness checks to address
the possibility that this bonus may have aﬀected our results.
4 Reduced Form Results
4.1 Estimating Hazard Plots
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the reform on the exit rates from unemployment. We
estimate the hazard rates with a linear probability model separately for each 15-day period21,
indexed by t, after entering unemployment insurance:
I(t∗i = t|t
∗
i ≥ t) = β0,t + β1,tPOSTi +Xiγ + ǫit, (8)
where i indexes individuals and t∗i represents the duration of unemployment of individual i.
The left hand side is an indicator for individual i ﬁnding a job in period t, conditional on
still being unemployed at the beginning of the period. The variable POSTi is an indicator
for individual i claiming beneﬁts in the post-reform period, while Xi is a matrix of control
variables. The equation is estimated separately for each period t on the sample of individuals
who are still unemployed at time t (that is conditional on t∗i ≥ t). The estimates for β0,t are
estimates for the hazard function in the pre-period, while the estimates for β1,t represent the
shift of the hazard function between the before and after period. In our baseline estimates we
do not control for any observables Xi, and show results controlling for Xi as robustness.
22
4.2 Main Result
Figure 4a) shows the estimates of equation (8) for each t with no controls. The blue line
represents the coeﬃcient estimates of β0,t, the estimated hazard function in the before period,
while the red line represents the estimated β0,t + β1,t, the after period hazard. Vertical lines
indicate that the diﬀerence between the two series is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Hungary. The unemployment rate was quite stable at around 7.5 percent during and after the two sample
periods. GDP growth was also stable during the sample periods, only slowing down at the beginning of 2007.
Below we show extensive robustness checks, showing that our results are not driven by changes in the economic
environment that occurred later and that the shape of the hazard rates are in fact very stable over time except
for the exact point when the UI policy changes.
21We choose a 15-day period so that the beneﬁt path steps after 90 days and 270 days occur at integer
values of these periods. The results are very similar with hazards computed at 7 days or 30 days.
22Note that these hazard functions should not be viewed as consistent estimates at the individual level,
but rather as estimates of the average hazard function in the population. While the natural experiment,
assuming the conditional independence assumption holds, identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of the reform on the
average population hazard function, the shape of this average hazard function is potentially aﬀected by duration
dependence or by changes in selection due to the reform. While we address diﬀerential selection in our reduced
form results section by comparing the estimated hazards controlling and not controlling for observables, an
important aspect of our structural estimation below will be to explicitly model unobserved heterogeneity.
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The exit rate from unemployment in the pre-reform period shows a familiar pattern for a
one-step unemployment system. The exit hazard falls in the ﬁrst months after entering UI,
then it increases as it approaches the exhaustion point of UI beneﬁts (at 270 days). After
this exhaustion point, it falls and spikes again as people exhaust the second tier beneﬁts,
unemployment assistance, at 360 days. The hazard rate then decreases monotonically, as
unemployed people are only eligible for welfare programs.
The exit hazard changes substantially after the introduction of a two-step system. The
hazard rate increases at 90 days, at the end of the higher unemployment insurance beneﬁt,
and remains elevated compared to the pre-reform period for the following 2.5 months. By
180 days, the pre- and post-reform hazards have converged, and both hazards increase at the
exhaustion of UI beneﬁts at 270 days. Importantly though, the post-reform hazard increases
signiﬁcantly less, and the pre-reform hazard remains signiﬁcantly higher for three months
following UI exhaustion. Finally, by 360 days, the end of unemployment assistance, the two
hazards have once again converged.
The most striking diﬀerence occurs around day 270, when in the pre-reform period the
exit hazard remains signiﬁcantly higher after the UI exhaustion point (270 days) relative to
the post-reform period. As we discussed above, this diﬀerence in hazards is hard to reconcile
with the standard model: from day 270 onwards, the beneﬁt levels are identical in the pre-
and post-period, and in addition the total amount of beneﬁts received up to day 270 is also
almost identical. Hence, in the standard model we would expect similar hazards (even with
heterogeneity, as we show below). A modiﬁed standard model with storable oﬀers could
potentially match the spike at 270 days, but it still does not explain the persistent diﬀerence
in the hazards after the exhaustion of beneﬁts.
The diﬀerence in hazards instead ﬁts nicely with the reference-dependent model: the work-
ers in the pre-reform period experience a larger drop-oﬀ in beneﬁts around day 270, inducing
a spike in loss utility and thus an increase in the value of search. The persistence for three
months of the higher hazard indicates slow adjustment of the reference point. Furthermore,
the increase in hazard in the pre-period happens already in anticipation of beneﬁt expiration
at day 270, consistent with the reference-dependent model.
While we focus mainly on the hazard rate around day 270 because it leads to the most
distinct predictions, the observed patterns around day 90 are also consistent with reference
dependence. The spike in the hazard at 90 days in the post-period, corresponding to the ﬁrst
step down in beneﬁts, disappears after 3-4 months, consistent once again with loss utility
and a slowly-adjusting reference point. However, the spike itself in this period could also be
explained by the standard model with unobserved heterogeneity, as we show below.
Figure 4b) shows the estimated survival function for the two groups. We obtain these
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estimates using a variant of equation (8), where we estimate the equation again pointwise
for all t but including the whole sample and taking P (t∗i ≥ t) as the outcome variable. The
survival functions diverge after 90 days, with lower survival probabilities in the after group
than in the before group. This diﬀerence persists until around 300 days, after which the
two lines converge. Since the expected duration in unemployment is simply the integral over
the survival function from 0 onwards, the expected unemployment duration is signiﬁcantly
reduced in the after period. It is striking that even though the reform made the UI system
more generous on average (since short term unemployed received more beneﬁts, while the
long-term unemployed received about the same), the expected duration decreased.
4.3 Robustness Checks
The results presented so far do not control for demographic characteristics. Even though the
diﬀerences in demographics between the pre- and the post-period are quite small (Table 1),
they could potentially explain diﬀerences in the hazard patterns over time if the demographic
impacts on the hazard rates are large. Thus, we re-estimate equation (8) controlling for a rich
set of observable characteristics, where we allow these characteristics to have arbitrary eﬀects
on the hazard function at each point, the only restriction being that the eﬀect is the same in
the before and after period. As Figure 5a) shows, controlling for observables has virtually no
eﬀect on the hazard rates, implying that they cannot explain our ﬁndings.23
A separate concern regards the introduction of the reemployment bonus in November 1st,
2005. While the take-up rate of the bonus was just 6% in our sample, it may still aﬀect the
hazard rate in the post-reform period, especially in the ﬁrst 90 days. As a check, we drop
all individuals that received a reemployment bonus and estimate our baseline speciﬁcation on
this restricted sample; the results are virtually unchanged (Figure 5b)).
In order to assure that the diﬀerences in the hazard rates are in fact due to the reform in
the UI system and not simply the result of some general trend, we exploit the fact that we have
additional data from 2004 and after 2006. First, we estimate two placebo tests for whether
there are diﬀerences in the two years before the reform and the one year before the reform,
using the same estimation strategy as before. We report these results in Appendix Figure A-
3a), revealing that the hazard rates are virtually unchanged between 2004 and 2005. There is
a small diﬀerence right after the 270 line, which is expected due to the reduction in unemploy-
ment assistance in February 2005, leading to a slight increase in the hazard at this point in
2005. Similarly Appendix Figure A-3b) shows that there are virtually no diﬀerences between
the hazards 1 and 2 years after the reform, again indicating that the diﬀerences between our
23Alternatively we also used propensity score reweighting to estimate the hazards in the pre- and post-period,
holding the observables constant over time and obtained almost identical results (not shown).
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before- and after-period line up nicely with the reform.
We explore the timing further by plotting time-series graphs of the exit hazards over
speciﬁc intervals. Figure 6a) shows the evolution over time of the exit hazard between 30
and 90 days (red line) and between 90 and 150 days (black line). Each dot indicates the
average hazard for each 3-month period between 2004 and 2007, with quarter 1 indicating
the ﬁrst 3-month period after the reform. Prior to the reform, the hazard at 90-150 days is
smaller than the hazard at 30-90 days, consistent with the patterns in Figure 5. Subsequent
to the reform introducing a step down of beneﬁts after 90 days, the pattern abruptly changes.
Already in the ﬁrst quarter after the reform, the hazard at 90-150 days increases sizeably,
becoming similar to the hazard at 30-90 days, a pattern that remains largely similar over the
next 6 quarters. The ﬁgure provides little evidence of previous trends, suggesting that the
changes in hazards are indeed a causal eﬀect of the reform.
Figure 6b) provides parallel evidence for the hazard at 210-270 days versus at 270-330
days. In the quarters pre-reform, the hazard at 270-330 days is signiﬁcantly higher than the
hazard at 210-270 days, a pattern that changes abruptly with the ﬁrst quarter following the
reform. The time-series plots again indicate a change that is coincidental with the reform and
not due underlying trends or changes in the macroeconomic environment.
5 Structural Estimation
5.1 Set-up and Estimation
We use the model of Section 2, imposing six additional assumptions, some of which we relax
later. The ﬁrst three assumptions concern the utility function. First, we assume that the
search cost function has a power form as in Paserman (2008) and Chetty (2003): c (s) =
ks1+γ/ (1 + γ). This form implies that the parameter γ is the inverse of the elasticity of
search eﬀort with respect to the net value of employment.24 Second, we assume log utility,
v (b) = ln (b). Third, similar to Bloemen (2005) and Paserman (2008), we model heterogeneity
as three types of unemployed workers that diﬀer in their cost of search k.
Fourth, to avoid modelling on-the-job search, we start the worker problem in the ﬁrst
period of unemployment, and thus ﬁt the hazard from the second period on.25 Fifth, we set
past wages equal to the median earnings in our sample, which is 135,000 HUF ($675), and
assume that reemployment wages are constant over the UI spell and equal to past wages.26
24To see this, recall that the ﬁrst-order condition of search eﬀort (equation 4) is c′ (s∗) = v, where we
denote with v the net value of employment (that is, the right-hand-side of equation 4). Given the parametric
assumption, this yields s∗ = (v/k)
1/γ
, and the elasticity of s∗ with respect to v is ηs,v = (ds/dv) v/s = 1/γ.
25Recall that a successful job search in period t yields a job in period t+ 1.
26In a robustness check, we present estimates assuming a lower reemployment wage.
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Sixth, we assume that individuals start with zero assets, that they cannot borrow against
their future income, and that they earn no interest on saved assets.
The vector of parameters ξ that we estimate for the standard model are: (i) the three
levels of search cost khigh, kmed, and klow, with the assumption khigh ≥ kmed ≥ klow, and
the two probability weights plow and pmed; (ii) the search cost curvature γ; (iii) the time
preference parameters δ and β. For the reference-dependent model, we estimate in addition:
(iv) the loss aversion parameter λ; and (v) the number of (15-day) periods N over which the
backward-looking reference point is formed.27 To keep the number of parameters the same
as for the standard model, in the reference-dependent model we assume only two cost types,
thus removing parameters kmed and pmed. Notice that the weight η on gain-loss utility is set to
1 in the benchmark estimates rather than being estimated; thus, the loss-aversion parameter
λ can be interpreted also as the overall weight on the losses. The reason for this assumption
is that over the course of the unemployment spell the individual is always on the loss side
since the beneﬁts are always (weakly) lower than the reference point. Hence, it is diﬃcult to
estimate a separate weight on gain utility and loss utility.28
Estimation. We use a minimum-distance estimator. Denote by m (ξ) the vector of
moments predicted by the theory as a function of the parameters ξ, and by mˆ the vector of
observed moments. The minimum-distance estimator chooses the parameters ξˆ that minimize
the distance (m (ξ)− mˆ)′W (m (ξ)− mˆ) , where W is a weighting matrix. As a weighting
matrix, we use a diagonal matrix that has as diagonal elements the inverse of the variance of
each moment.29 To calculate the theoretical moments, we use backward induction. First we
numerically compute the steady-state search and steady-state value of unemployment using
a hybrid bisection-quadratic interpolation method, pre-implemented in Matlab as the fzero
routine. Then we solve backwards for the optimal search intensity and consumption path in
each period as a function of the asset level. Finally, we use the initial asset level as a starting
value to determine the actual consumption path and search intensity in each period.
Under standard conditions, the minimum-distance estimator using weighting matrix W
achieves asymptotic normality, with estimated variance (Gˆ′WGˆ)−1(Gˆ′W ΛˆWGˆ)(Gˆ′WGˆ)−1/N ,
where Gˆ ≡ N−1
∑N
i=1∇ξmi(ξˆ) and Λˆ ≡ V ar[m(ξˆ)] (Wooldridge, 2010). We calculate ∇ξm(ξˆ)
numerically in Matlab using an adaptive ﬁnite diﬀerence algorithm.
Moments. As moments m (ξ) we use the 15-day hazard rates from day 15 to day 540 for
both the pre-reform and post-reform period, for a total of 35*2=70 moments. We do not use
the hazard from the ﬁrst 15 day period, since it would require modelling search on the job.
27In the estimations tables we report the speed of adjustment in days, which is just N*15.
28In principle, the weight on gain utility η can be separately identiﬁed as we show in a robustness section,
since gain utility aﬀects the utility of reemployment, but the reemployment utility does not allow for very
precise identiﬁcation of η.
29As robustness check below, we alternatively use the identity matrix as a weighting matrix.
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Identification. While the parameters are identiﬁed jointly, it is possible to address the
main sources of identiﬁcation of individual parameters. The cost of eﬀort parameters kj are
identiﬁed from both the level of search intensity and the path of the hazards over time. This
is clearest in the standard model, where the heterogeneity in the parameters is needed, for
example, to explain the decay in the hazard after day 360, when beneﬁts remain constant and
thus, in absence of heterogeneity, the hazard would be constant in the standard model (but
not in the reference-dependent model). The search cost curvature parameter, γ, is identiﬁed
by the responsiveness of the hazard rate to changes in beneﬁts since 1/γ is the elasticity of
search eﬀort with respect to the (net) value of ﬁnding a job.
The time preference parameters are identiﬁed by the presence of spikes around beneﬁt
cuts, among other moments. If the unemployed workers are patient, they save in advance
of beneﬁt decreases so as to smooth consumption. Impatient workers, instead, save little if
at all and thus experience a sharp decrease in consumption around the beneﬁt change. This
consumption drop then induces a sharp increase in search eﬀort as the beneﬁts decrease.
Turning to the reference-dependence parameters, for a given value of η (ﬁxed to 1 in the
benchmark speciﬁcation), λ denotes the magnitude of the loss utility. A major component to
identiﬁcation is the extent to which the hazard for the pre-period is higher both before and
after day 270, in response to a larger loss. Instead, the standard model has essentially identical
hazards from day 270 onwards. The loss parameter is also identiﬁed by the response to other
changes in the beneﬁts, such as at 90 days in the post-period. The parameter N , which
indicates the speed at which the losses are reabsorbed into the reference point, is identiﬁed
by the fact that the pre- and post-reform hazards converge a few months after day 270. The
speed of convergence of the hazard after day 90 also suggests several months of adjustment.
5.2 Hand-to-Mouth Estimates
To build intuition, we ﬁrst present estimates assuming that workers in each period consume
the per-period income. Figure 7a) presents the ﬁt for the standard model with 3-type hetero-
geneity. The model ﬁts quite well the surge in hazard around day 90 in the post-period, and
the decreasing path of the hazard in the ﬁrst 200 days. The ﬁt is also reasonably good for
the period from day 400 on. However, the ﬁt between days 250 and 400 is poor. As discussed
above, the standard model predicts that the hazard rates for the pre- and post-period should
be almost exactly the same after day 270. As such, the model misses both the sharp diﬀerence
in hazard between day 260 and day 360, as well as the spikes at both 260 and 360 days.
In comparison, Figure 7b) displays the ﬁt of the reference-dependent model with two types
(and thus the same number of parameters as in the standard model). The ﬁt in the ﬁrst 250
days is very good, though it was quite good also for the standard model. But, as anticipated,
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the model does much better for longer durations, where the standard model ﬁts poorly. In
particular, the model ﬁts better the surge in the hazard rate in the pre-period in anticipation
of the beneﬁt cut after 270 days (which is larger in the pre period than in the post-period), as
well as the elevated level for the following three months, compared to the pre-period. Then
the model tracks quite well the period following the exhaustion of unemployment assistance
(after 360 days). The ﬁt of the reference-dependent model, while superior to the standard
model, is certainly not perfect. The most striking aspect of the data which the model does
not capture is the large spike on day 270 for the pre-period; storable oﬀers may play a role
in this case. In addition, the reference-dependent model under-ﬁts the diﬀerence in hazards
between the pre- and post-period after day 270.
In Table 2 we present the parameter estimates. The estimates for the standard model (Col-
umn (1)) indicate substantial heterogeneity in cost k and low cost curvature γˆ = .13. This
implies a high elasticity of search eﬀort to incentives, needed to ﬁt the substantial hazard
increases in response to beneﬁts changes. The estimates for the reference-dependent model
(Column (2)) indicate a substantial weight on loss utility, λˆ = 3.5 (s.e. 1.3), and slow adjust-
ment of the reference point, Nˆ = 216 (s.e. 9) days. At the bottom of the Table, we report the
goodness of ﬁt (GOF) measure (m (ξ)− mˆ)′W (m (ξ)− mˆ). The reference-dependent model
has a substantially better ﬁt (GOF of 170 versus 215), for equal number of parameters.
5.3 Benchmark Estimates with Consumption-Savings
While the previous estimates indicate that a reference-dependent model can ﬁt the patterns in
the data quite well, there is a key concern with the hand-to-mouth estimates. Individuals who
anticipate experiencing loss utility from a beneﬁt cut should save in anticipation, allowing
them to smooth consumption around the beneﬁt cut. In turn, this would imply smoother
hazards around the beneﬁt cuts than in the data. This consumption smoothing, however, is
ruled out in the hand-to-mouth model.
A parallel issue arises for the hand-to-mouth estimates of the standard model. The esti-
mated patience parameter in the standard model (δˆ = .98) implies forward-looking individuals
who are quite responsive in their search eﬀort to future beneﬁt cuts. And yet, by assumption
these individuals do not save in anticipation of the cuts. For these reasons, we now turn to
the estimates modelling a consumption-savings choice, in addition to the search eﬀort choice.
Figure 8a) shows the ﬁt for the standard model with three types, compared with the ﬁt in
Figure 8b) for a reference-dependent model with two types (with once again the same number
of parameters). The qualitative ﬁt is similar to the ﬁt obtained for hand-to-mouth consumers
(Figures 7a) and b)): the reference-dependent model better ﬁts the path in the hazard.
How is that possible in light of the above intuition about counteracting savings? For an
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answer, we turn to Table 3 which displays the corresponding parameter estimates in Columns
(1) and (2). The most striking element is the high estimated degree of impatience: 15-day
discount factors of δ = 0.89 for the reference-dependent model and δ = 0.93 for the standard
model. Either estimate implies an annual discount factor of 0.17 or lower. Appendix Figure
A-4a) provides further evidence on the identiﬁcation of the discount factor. Each point in
the ﬁgure indicates the goodness of ﬁt of the best-ﬁtting estimate for a particular (15-day)
discount factor. For patient individuals (δ = 0.995 or higher), the reference-dependent model
does poorly: loss-averse workers with a high degree of patience would build a buﬀer stock,
thus smoothing the loss utility. As individuals become more impatient, already for δ = 0.95
the reference dependent model has a good ﬁt (and better than the standard model), with the
best ﬁt, as we saw in the table, for an even lower discount factor. The ﬁt of the standard
model also improves as the discount factor decreases, though less steeply.
These results stress the importance of modelling optimal consumption: both the standard
model and the reference-dependent model have a somewhat worse ﬁt compared to the hand-to-
mouth estimates. The hand-to-mouth results embed an inconsistent combination of relatively
high patience (and thus forward-looking search eﬀort) and yet no consumption smoothing. In
the consumption-savings model, the discount factor drives at the same time both the search
decision and the consumption-savings decision, putting additional restrictions on the model.
Returning to the point estimates, the downside of this set of results is that the model which
best accommodates the data – the reference-dependent one – requires a degree of impatience
which is hard to reconcile with other estimates in the literature. Yet, this high estimated
degree of impatience may be due to a mis-speciﬁcation of the discounting function. A growing
body of evidence, summarized among others in Frederick et al. (2002) and DellaVigna (2009),
suggests that the beta-delta model of time preferences due to Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999) provides a better ﬁt of observed behavior in a number of settings. The beta-
delta model includes an additional discount factor β between the present and the next period
to capture the present bias, inducing a time inconsistency.
Thus, in a second set of estimates we allow for beta-delta discounting30 in both the stan-
dard model and the reference-dependent model. To keep the number of parameters constant,
we set the long-term discount factor δ to .995. The results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3
and in Figure 8c) show that the ﬁt is better than in the models with delta discounting for the
reference-dependent model with much more plausible discounting: the estimated present-bias
parameter is β = 0.58, implying a discount factor of 0.46 for the ﬁrst year and of 0.88 for
subsequent years. This indicates a substantial degree of impatience, but in line with esti-
30We assume that consumers are naive about the future self-control problem mostly for computational
simplicity, especially given the complexity of estimating the consumption decision. In addition, the naiveté
assumption is arguably better supported by the evidence (DellaVigna, 2009).
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mates in the literature. For example, Paserman (2008), building on the model in DellaVigna
and Paserman (2005), estimates a job search model with beta-delta preferences and obtains
estimates for beta ranging between 0.40 and 0.89, depending on the sample. Laibson et al.
(2007), based on life-cycle consumption choices, estimates a β between 0.51 and 0.82.
In light of both the higher plausibility and the better ﬁt, we adopt the reference-dependent
model with beta-delta discounting as the benchmark behavioral model in the rest of the paper.
For the standard model, especially given the small diﬀerence in ﬁt between the two discounting
functions, we use the more standard delta discounting.31
How do the two models achieve their ﬁt? In Appendix Figures A-5 and A-6 we report plots
for key model components, focusing on the high-cost type. In the standard model, the ﬂow
utility follows the step down in the beneﬁts, with the size of the later steps accentuated by the
curvature of the utility function. In the reference-dependent model, the ﬂow utility captures
also the intensity of the loss relative to the reference point. The value of unemployment
decreases over time in the standard model as expected, while in the reference-dependent
model it actually increases over most of the range, reﬂecting the importance of reference
point adaptation. This ﬁts the observed decrease in search eﬀort over time, even for a given
type. Furthermore, the value of unemployment declines sharply in correspondence to the
beneﬁt drop. (This sharp drop reﬂects the estimated impatience). The next panel shows the
reference point path, which is decreasing over time. Notice that from around day 250 the
reference point is higher in the pre-reform group, which contributes to generate higher loss
utility and thus a larger increase in search eﬀort near beneﬁt expiration.
In Appendix Figure A-6, the value of employment, which is almost constant in the standard
model, increases monotonically over time for the reference-dependent model, as getting a job
is associated with a larger gain utility as the reference point declines. This latter force does not
account for much of the results, as we illustrate later when we turn oﬀ gain utility. Turning to
consumption and assets, consumption tracks quite closely the per-period earnings, especially
in the reference-dependent model. As such, assets get depleted quickly and remain at zero
or close for the rest of the spell. While we do not observe consumption in our data, other
work (e.g. Ganong and Noel, 2015) has documented that consumption for UI recipients tracks
income rather closely with sharp drops at UI entry and beneﬁt exhaustion.
In the ﬁnal set of columns in Table 3 we return to a key motivation of the paper. We
argued that the reference-dependent model can, at least in principle, capture the qualitative
features of the hazard from unemployment without any heterogeneity. Yet, the estimates of
reference-dependent model allow for two heterogeneous types. In Columns (5) and (6), we
remove any heterogeneity and estimate the reference-dependent model with only one cost type.
31The results for the reference-dependent models with either delta or beta-delta discounting are qualitatively
similar in all the subsequent speciﬁcations.
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This bare-bones model ﬁts the data better than the standard model (goodness of ﬁt of 183
compared to 227), despite having two fewer parameters. As Figure 8d) shows, the qualitative
ﬁt is almost as good as in the reference-dependent models with heterogeneity.
5.4 Reference-Dependence Variants
In Table 4 we consider variants of the benchmark reference-dependent model, reproduced in
Column (1). First, instead of deﬁning the reference point as the average of income over the
N previous periods, we assume an AR(1) process for the reference point:
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)yt = (1− ρ)
∞∑
i=1
ρiyt−i
This updating rule has longer “memory” and adjusts more smoothly than the benchmark
reference point, with the speed of adjustment captured by ρ.32 Column (2) of Table 4 shows
the estimated speed of adjustment ρ=0.77, which implies faster adjustment (half-life is 40
days) than in the benchmark case. The goodness of ﬁt with AR(1) updating is very similar
to the one in the benchmark estimates. Figure 9a) shows the ﬁt of this AR(1) model.33
Next, we disentangle the role played by gain and loss utility. So far, we have arbitrarily set
the gain utility parameter, η, to 1 and estimated the weight on loss utility, ηλ. In Columns
(3) and (4) we examine the role of gain and loss utility by including only one at a time in the
model. In Column (3) we assume no gain utility when workers get a job, but still estimate
the loss utility weight ηλ. The ﬁt of the model, visible in Figure 9b), is almost as good as
the benchmark reference-dependent one, and the estimated speed of updating of the reference
point is nearly the same (though not, as expected, the estimated loss aversion). In Column
(4), we instead assume no loss utility and model gain utility. This model does worse than
even the standard model (Figure 9c). This indicates the key role played by loss utility.
Next, we present a parallel take on this result. Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates
setting, respectively, a value of η of 0.2 and of 5. As the (assumed) weight on gain utility η
increases, the estimated λ decreases, holding the term ηλ, which is the weight on loss utility,
at comparable (though not constant) levels. The goodness of ﬁt under these alternative
assumptions for η is almost the same as in the standard model. In Column (7), we estimate
32When we implement this estimate we assume that the memory of the AR(1) update goes back to 1050
days (or 70 15-day periods).
33We adopt as benchmark the N-period reference point for computational reasons, since the long memory
of the AR(1) model makes the estimates more time-consuming. In addition, we do not estimate models with
a forward-looking reference point as in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). These models typically give rise to multiple
equilibria which would complicate the model solution signiﬁcantly. However, notice that it is unclear that
forward-looking reference points would explain the diﬀerence in hazards after period 270. By that point, the
forward-looking reference points would presumably be the same in the pre- and post-period, leading to similar
predictions for the two periods (up to equilibrium selection), counterfactually.
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separately η and λ, with the ﬁt shown in Figure 9d). The two parameters are in principle
separately identiﬁed, but the estimate for η (4.5) is imprecise, and the goodness of ﬁt is again
close to the benchmark model. As such, in the rest of the paper we hold η ﬁxed to 1.
5.5 Habit Formation
How does reference dependence compare to habit formation? Models a la Constantinides
(1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) assume utility u(c − zr), where r is the habit
formed from past consumption and u is a concave function. Habit formation, like reference
dependence, induces a temporarily high marginal utility following a beneﬁt cut, as consump-
tion c gets closer to the habit zr. Thus, it could also plausibly ﬁt the patterns in the data.
We estimate a version of a habit formation model replacing the reference dependent utility
function (deﬁned in Equation (1)) with the utility:
v(ct, rt) = log(ct − zrt),
where z captures the responsiveness to changes in the habit and rt is calculated the same way
as before, but reinterpreted as a measure of habit stock.34 The estimates are in Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5, allowing for a ﬁxed N for updating of the reference point and for an AR(1)
process. In either case, the ﬁt is not close to the ﬁt of the reference-dependent model, and is
in fact slightly worse than the standard model (see also Figures 10a-b).
This may appear surprising given the similar intuition behind the two models. The models
however diﬀer in a key aspect. In the reference-dependent model, the impact of the loss,
λ(u(c)− u(r)), on search eﬀort is approximately proportional to the size of the loss. Instead,
in the habit-formation model larger decreases in consumption have disproportionate eﬀect,
as c gets closer to zr. Given this, the habit-formation model ﬁts the data less well, since it
predicts a larger spike at the 90-day (post reform) beneﬁt decrease, and a much smaller spike
for the later (proportionally smaller) beneﬁt decreases.35 Allowing for three unobserved types
(Column (3)) only partially improves the ﬁt.
Next, we consider a second type of habit-formation models with so-called multiplicative
habits (Abel, 1990), with utility log(c) − zlog(r). This utility function is equivalent (up to a
linear transformation) to our reference-dependent model with loss aversion λ set to 1 and η set
to z/(1−z). In Column (4) (and in Figure 10d) we present estimates from this multiplicative-
habit model: the ﬁt is superior to the one of the ﬁrst habit-formation model, though still not
34Observe that this function is not deﬁned whenever ct < zrt, complicating the estimation. To avoid this
problem, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) made z a non-linear function of yt − rt. We treat z as a parameter
instead and check in the optimum that our utility function is deﬁned for the relevant yt and rt.
35In addition, the habit-formation model is also computationally trickier to estimate, as the estimated habit
parameter γ has to always satisfy the condition c > γr.
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close to the benchmark model. This result stresses again the importance of loss aversion.
5.6 Robustness
In Table 6 we consider the robustness of the standard and reference-dependent model to
alternative speciﬁcations. We present additional checks in Appendix Table A-1.
In Column (1) we estimate both time preference parameters, β and δ. While the ﬁt is
somewhat better than in the benchmark models, the two time preference parameters appear
to be quite collinear; thus, in the benchmark speciﬁcations we ﬁx one of the two parameters.
In Column (2) we allow for background consumption: workers receive non-market income
n during unemployment, in addition to the beneﬁts earned, to capture home production.
The estimates are very similar to the standard ones. In Column (3), while still allowing for
background consumption, we make the alternative assumption that workers are not eligible
for welfare; thus, beneﬁts fall to 0 after 360 days.36 This alternative assumption improves
somewhat the ﬁt of both the reference-dependent model and the standard model. In Column
(4) we allow for a linear time trend in the baseline cost factor allowing for skill depreciation or
conversely learning by searching. This additional parameter improves the ﬁt of the reference-
dependent model while leaving the ﬁt of the standard model essentially unaﬀected.
In Column (5) we explore the role played by the spikes at days 270 and 360, since one may
worry that such spikes play a disproportional role in the identiﬁcation given the quadratic
distance measure. The model estimated dropping these moments from the objective function
(see also Appendix Figure A-7c and d) yields similar patterns indicating that the results are
not driven by the spikes. We also consider the importance of timing in the model. We assume
that jobs start one period after the oﬀer is received, but what if the hiring process takes longer?
In Column (6) we assume a 2-period (that is, approximately one-month) delay between the
job search and the start of the wage payments. As Appendix Figures A-8a) and b) show, the
change in timing does not shift the spike. Rather, job-seekers start their search eﬀort earlier,
taking into account the longer delay. In Column (7) we allow for a lower reemployment wage
set at two thirds of the average previous wage. The alternative assumption worsens somewhat
the ﬁt of both models, with little substantive impact on the estimates. In Column (8) we test
the importance of the assumption of zero initial assets: endowing workers with $600 in their
last period of employment does not aﬀect much the estimates (see also Appendix Figure A-7a)
and b)), though the ﬁt is somewhat worse than under the assumption of zero assets (which
itself is most consistent with the estimated high impatience).
In Appendix Table A-1 we present additional robustness results. In Column (1) we use
36While unemployed workers are generally eligible for welfare after beneﬁt exhaustion, the rules are complex
and we do not observe a good measure of welfare take up. Thus, we explore this alternative.
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the identity matrix to weight the moments and in Column (2) we use the moments estimated
after controlling for observables (shown in Figure 5b)). Though the goodness of ﬁt cannot be
compared to the previous estimates, the qualitative conclusions remain the same. In Columns
(3) and (4), instead of using the hazard rates as moments, we use the estimated (unconditional)
probability of exiting unemployment in each 15-day period. The advantage of this alternative
procedure is that we can use the full variance-covariance matrix for weights, which we do
in Column (3). Once again, while the goodness of ﬁt measures are not comparable to the
benchmark models, the pattern of the results is very similar. Finally, the estimates are similar
if we use the 30-day hazards or 7-day hazards, instead of 15-day hazards.
5.7 Unobserved Heterogeneity
So far, we have modeled one form of heterogeneity, in search costs,37 and allowed for a ﬁxed
number of types: three in the standard model and two in the behavioral model. In Table 7,
we relax both assumptions.
First, we increase the number of heterogeneous cost types from 2 types (Column (1)) all the
way to 5 types (Column (4)). Allowing for additional types in the standard model improves the
ﬁt all the way to 4 types; estimates with 5 or more types have trouble converging. Still, even
the model with 4 or 5 types does signiﬁcantly worse in terms of ﬁt than the reference-dependent
model (Figure 11a). For the reference-dependent model, there is essentially no improvement
in ﬁt going from 2 types to more types. Indeed, estimates of the reference-dependent model
with more than 3 types have trouble converging.
Next, we consider alternative forms of unobserved heterogeneity, such as in the reemploy-
ment wage. We take the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the reemployment wage, as well
as the fractions of each type (taken to be 20 percent, 60 percent, and 20 percent respectively)
from the data. We then estimate three cost parameters kj, one for each type. This alternative
speciﬁcation (Column (5)) improves somewhat the ﬁt of the standard model, as Figure 11b)
also shows, but the ﬁt of the reference-dependent model is still signiﬁcantly better.
In Column (6) we allow for heterogeneity in the curvature parameter γ. While this form
of heterogeneity does not aﬀect the estimates of the reference-dependent model, it improves
dramatically the ﬁt of the standard model. The estimates ﬁt both the spike at 270 and at 360
days, as well as the diﬀerence between the pre- and post-reform period (Figure 11(c)). Indeed,
this is the only speciﬁcation with a better ﬁt than the reference-dependent model. How does
this model attain such good ﬁt? The ﬁt relies heavily on types with a very diﬀerent elasticity
of search (which equals 1/γ). Initially, most exits are of the low-elasticity types (γhigh = 1.01),
but the spike at day 270 is driven by the medium-elasticity types (γmed = 0.20). These types
37The heterogeneity on search costs is based on papers such as Bloemen (2005) and Paserman (2008).
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were barely searching up until day 270, but their search intensity spikes in presence of lower
beneﬁts. The spike at 360 days is due to the high-elasticity types, with an elasticity over 50
(γlow = 0.016), that start searching once beneﬁts hit the welfare level.
How critical are the high-elasticity types for the ﬁt of the model? We re-estimate the
model restricting the elasticity to be no higher than 10 (γ ≥ 0.1, Column (7)) and no higher
than 5 (γ ≥ 0.2, Column (8)). With such restrictions in place, the model does not match any
more the ﬁt of the reference-dependent model (see also Figure 11d)).
5.8 Tests of Gamma Heterogeneity
The previous sections show that only one version of the standard model matches (in fact,
surpasses) the ﬁt of the reference-dependent model: the gamma-heterogeneity model. How
should we compare then the two models? In this section we present a calibration and additional
evidence, with more evidence in the next section.
As we just showed, the gamma-heterogeneity model requires two types with a very large
elasticity of search eﬀort. To consider the implications of such elasticities, consider a hypo-
thetical comparative statics: a 10 percent increase, or decrease, in the level of welfare beneﬁts
paid out after 360 days. Figures 12a) and b) show that, in response to such a small beneﬁt
change, the search eﬀort of reference-dependent workers would barely change compared to the
benchmark estimates. In the gamma-heterogeneity model, instead, the hazard rates would
go to nearly 1 (for a 10% beneﬁt decrease, Figure 12a)) or to nearly 0 (for a 10% increase,
Figure 12b)). The workers still unemployed by day 360 are mostly the high-elasticity types,
and even small changes in the setting lead to massive changes in search eﬀort. We ﬁnd this
implied response unrealistic. Importantly, this high elasticity, and thus the ensuing extreme
response, is critical for the ﬁt of the gamma-elasticity model, as we documented above.
While there are no reforms in the welfare system in our period, we do observe a reform
in the unemployment assistance system occurring one year before our ‘pre’ period (see Figure
3). The beneﬁt duration in this second tier goes from 180 days before the change to 90 days
after the change for the individuals in our sample.38 We use this reform, which we have not
employed so far, as an out-of-sample test, since the macroeconomic setting was similar and
the group of workers aﬀected is the same.
Figure 12c) shows the hazard for the 2-year-prior period, as well as the predictions for
the benchmark reference-dependent estimates (Column (4) in Table 3) and for the gamma-
heterogeneity estimates (Column (6) in Table 7). The reference-dependent model ﬁts the
pre-period well, with an out-of-sample SSE of 73.4. The gamma heterogeneity model, instead,
38This change applied to individuals aged 45 and lower. Since our sample includes only individuals up to 50
years old, the reform applies to the large majority of the sample. Excluding the 46-50 year olds barely aﬀects
the estimates.
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ﬁts quite poorly the period of the lengthened unemployment assistance (between 300 and
450 days), with an out-of-sample SSE of 130.5. In this period, the medium-elasticity types
are disappearing from the sample, and the high-elasticity types are not searching yet. The
gamma heterogeneity type appears to overﬁt the data in sample. The out-of-sample ﬁt of the
standard model with heterogeneity in cost levels is better (SSE of 91.6), but does not reach
the reference-dependent model. We present a ﬁnal piece of evidence in the next section.
5.9 Dynamic Selection throughout the UI spell
The standard model captures reasonably well the dynamics in the hazards in the ﬁrst 270
days as well as some of the trend after that, especially in the gamma-heterogeneity version.
To achieve this ﬁt, changes in the unobserved types over time play a key role; without types,
the hazards would be monotonically (weakly) increasing over time. How plausible then is the
amount of heterogeneity that the standard model requires? And how does it compare to the
heterogeneity needed in the reference-dependent model?
While we cannot measure the time-changing unobserved heterogeneity, we propose that a
useful metric is the time-varying selection on observables of the unemployed. Assuming that
unobservable factors that inﬂuence job search correlate with these observable characteristics,
these estimates convey useful information.
To document the dynamic selection along observables, we regress at the individual level
the realized unemployment duration (censored at 540 days) on a rich set of observables:
education, age groups, gender, waiting period (the number of days between job lost and UI
claimed), log past earnings, indicators for county of residence, day of the month UI claimed,
and occupation (1 digit) of the last job. As Web Appendix Table WA-1 shows, for both
individuals in the pre- and post-sample (Columns (1) and (2)), these variables are reliable
predictors of non-employment duration, with an R2 of 0.05-0.06. Panel B shows that the
predicted unemployment duration based on these estimates for the pre-period varies between
230 days (5th percentile) and 370 days (95th percentile), a good amount of variation.
The dotted lines with crosses in Figure 13a-b) show the predicted unemployment duration
averaging across all individuals who exit unemployment in a given 15-day period. While pre-
dicted unemployment increases (unsurprisingly) throughout the spell, the overall relationship
is quite ﬂat: predicted unemployment only increases from 280 days to 295 days after around 2
years. Furthermore, the pattern of selection is not much aﬀected by the UI beneﬁt path. The
lines for the pre- and post-reform period are fairly parallel for most of the spell.39 Selection
on observables thus plays only a limited role in the data.
39The fact that dynamic selection seems to be small and not much aﬀected by the UI regime has been shown
before, for example Schmieder et al. (2016).
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The selection over time in predicted duration has a counterpart in the structural models.
For each cost type, we compute the expected unemployment duration in the pre-reform period.
We then calculate the average expected duration for unemployed individuals who leave in a
given period according to the estimated models. The reference-dependent model (solid lines
in Figure 13) predicts that the type composition changes only in the ﬁrst 90 days and not
by much; thus the expected unemployment duration line is quite ﬂat and not so dissimilar
from what we observe empirically. The standard model with cost heterogeneity (Figure 13a))
instead displays a large amount of dynamic selection, with a large swing until 200 days, with no
corresponding evidence in the data. The predicted heterogeneity for the gamma-heterogeneity
model (Figure 13b)) is even more at odds with the data, with an initial swing, and then an
abrupt swing between 300 and 360 days, corresponding to the transition from the medium-
to the high-elasticity type. There is no evidence of a corresponding shift in the data.
Thus, the pattern of dynamic selection implied by two versions of the standard model
appear at odds with the much more muted and monotonic selection in the data. We should
be clear that it is not surprising that the selection on observables be more muted than the
selection implied by the model, given that we only observe part of the selection. However,
the extent of the diﬀerence is quite striking, given the rich set of variables used in calculating
dynamic selection. Moreover, it is puzzling for the standard model that the observed selection
does not display any of the trends in the model predictions, even on a more muted scale.40
5.10 Reservation Wages
So far we take the reemployment wage as ﬁxed so the unemployed accept every job oﬀer.41
While this is consistent with a literature documenting a small role of reservation wages for job
search dynamics (e.g. Card et al., 2007a; Krueger and Mueller, 2013; Schmieder et al., 2016),
a natural question is whether introducing a reservation wage would change our conclusions.
For tractability, we estimate a reference-dependent model with choice of search eﬀort and
reservation wage, but with hand-to-mouth consumers. These results should be considered
only suggestive, as endogenizing consumption is important, as we documented above.
We reestimate the model incorporating job acceptance decisions, using additional moments
based on reemployment wages and solving by backward induction. In this expanded model,
40While the Altonji et al. (2005) procedure motivates this test, the parallel is imperfect. Altonji et al.
(2005) infers the impact of unobservable variables on the the magnitude of an estimate, based on the impact
of the observables. In our case, we would like to infer the extent and the role of unobserved heterogeneity
in the structural model, based on the heterogeneity captured by observables. The underlying assumption of
our procedure is that the set of observable variables used in predicting dynamic selections are rich enough to
capture (part of) the dynamic selection if its there, and also that the time path of dynamic selection caused
by observables is similar to the one caused by unobserved factors. .
41In the baseline model there is a single reemployment wage for everyone, while in the models in Table 7,
Column (5) we allow for 3 diﬀerent groups of workers, each facing a diﬀerent ﬁxed reemployment wage.
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individuals draw job oﬀers from a (stationary) log-normal wage oﬀer distribution and decide
whether or not to accept it. For simplicity, we also abstract away from gain (or loss) utility
at reemployment. We set the standard deviation of the wage oﬀer distribution at 0.5, close
to the standard deviation of the actual reemployment wages, and we estimate the mean of
the wage oﬀer distribution. As additional moments, we use the average reemployment wage
of individuals exiting unemployment in period t after entering the UI system, adding 70
additional moments in the minimum distance estimator.42
Web Appendix Table WA-2 shows the results in Columns (1) and (2). The reference-
dependent model has a better ﬁt than the standard model (GOF of 272 versus 308), largely
due to the reference-dependent model providing a better ﬁt for the hazard moments (see also
Web Appendix Figures WA-1). Notice however that the estimates in Columns (1) and (2), not
unlike the hand-to-mouth estimates in Table 2, have relatively patient unemployed workers,
at odds with the maintained assumption of hand-to-mouth consumption. For the sake of
comparison, Columns (3) and (4) provide estimates of the hand-to-mouth models with no
reservation wage choice assuming no gain utility at reemployment.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We provided evidence that a model with reference-dependent preferences can explain qual-
itative features of the hazards which plausible versions of the standard model have a hard
time ﬁtting. The model itself builds on one of the most robust behavioral models, reference
dependence, and uses a natural candidate for a backward-looking reference point. We also
ﬁnd that job seekers are substantially impatient, likely in the form of present-bias preferences.
This evidence has policy implications. A key prediction of reference-dependent job search
is that step-wise beneﬁt schedule can induce considerably more search than predicted by
the standard job search models. Moreover, if the social planner wants the job seekers to
search more than they do (e.g. because she uses a lower discount rate for welfare assessment
than that of the unemployed), then having beneﬁt drops over the UI spell is likely to be an
inexpensive way to achieve that goal. In support of that, Lindner and Reizer (2015) show that
the Hungarian UI reform examined here did not just speed up exits to employment, but it was
revenue-neutral from the perspective of the government. Therefore, the evidence presented
here opens the door to potential redesigns in unemployment insurance policies.
42The reemployment wage moments are estimated as in Lindner and Reizer (2015), allowing for a linear
time trend.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Comparing Means of Main Vari-
ables Pre- and Post UI Reform
before after diﬀ t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Women 41% 46% 5.2% 5.75
(0.006) (0.006)
Age in Years 36.8 36.9 0.06 0.47
(0.1) (0.1)
Imputed Education (years) 12.83 13.00 0.17 4.20
based on occupation (0.028) (0.031)
Log Earnings in 2002 11.55 11.52 -0.03 -3.56
(0.006) (0.006)
Log Earnings in 2003 11.70 11.68 -0.03 -2.72
(0.005) (0.007)
Log Earnings in 2004 11.79 11.78 -0.01 -1.37
(0.007) (0.007)
Waiting period∗ 31.1 32.0 0.84 1.18
(0.47) (0.51)
Reemployment bonus claimed 0.000 0.059 0.059 19.81
(0) (0.003)
Participate in training N.A. 0.042
(0.003)
Number of observations† 6305 5562
Notes:
Participation in training programs was not recorded prior to 2006.
∗ Number of days between job loss and UI claim.
† There are some missing values for earnings in 2002-2004 .
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Table 2: Structural Estimation of Standard and Refer-
ence Dependent Model with Hand-to-Mouth Consumers
Standard Ref. Dep.
3-type 2-type
(1) (2)
Parameters of Utility Function
Loss aversion λ 3.55
(1.27)
Adjustment speed of reference point N 216.49
in days (9.06)
Discount factor (15 days) δ 0.98 0.91
(0.06) (0.02)
Parameters of Search Cost Function
Curvature of search cost γ 0.13 0.60
(0.26) (0.15)
Search cost for high cost type khigh 126.59 203.17
(151.97) (70.10)
Search cost for medium cost type kmed 75.65
(117.65)
Search cost for low cost type klow 26.38 16.03
(45.36) (6.52)
Share of high cost UI claimant 0.34 0.98
(0.17) (0.01)
Share of medium cost UI claimant 0.49
(0.16)
Model Fit
Number of moments used 70 70
Number of estimated parameters 7 7
Goodness of Fit 215.2 170.2
Notes:
The table shows parameter estimates for the standard and the
reference dependent search model. Estimation is based on mini-
mum distance estimation, using the hazard rates in the pre- and
post-reform periods as the moments.
Standard errors for estimated parameters in parentheses.
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Table 3: Benchmarks Estimates with Endogeneous Savings
Standard Ref. Dep. Standard Ref. Dep. Ref. Dep. Ref. Dep.
3 type 2 type 3 type 2 type 1 type 1 type
delta est delta est beta est beta est delta est beta est
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parameters of Utility Function
Loss aversion λ 4.17 4.31 4.95 4.69
(0.69) (0.32) (0.59) (0.62)
Adjustment speed of reference point N 204.17 172.80 184.22 167.52
in days (17.94) (11.64) (10.98) (11.15)
Discount factor (15 days) δ 0.93 0.89 0.995 0.995 0.891 0.995
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Discount factor β 1 1 0.92 0.58 1 0.58
(0.01) (0.03) (0.19)
Parameters of Search Cost Function
Curvature of search cost γ 0.4 0.7 0.07 0.4 0.8 0.4
(0.046) (0.2) (0.01) (0.0) (0.2) (0.2)
Search cost for high cost type khigh 168.1 281.4 441.8 104.7 355.7 108.5
(98.595) (122.2) (.) (14.2) (154.9) (18.3)
Search cost for medium cost type kmed 49.7 98.0
(1.894) (9.7)
Search cost for low cost type klow 12.9 13.9 13.3 3.1
(1.239) (7.2) (1.9) (1.0)
Share of high cost UI claimant 0.2 0.99 0.2 0.99
(0.074) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Share of medium cost UI claimant 0.6 0.7
(0.059) (0.01)
Model Fit
Number of moments used 70 70 70 70 70 70
Number of estimated parameters 7 7 7 7 5 5
Goodness of Fit 227.5 182.4 229.0 175.9 194.0 183.5
Notes:
The table shows parameter estimates for the standard and the reference-dependent search model. Estimation is
based on minimum distance estimation, using the hazard rates in the pre- and post-reform periods as the moments.
Standard errors for estimated parameters in parentheses.
(.) indicates that the parameter is not well identiﬁed, i.e. the Hessian cannot be inverted close to the reported values
and therefore we do not provide standard errors. The other standard errors are calculated by inverting the Hessian
matrix after dropping the parameter from the matrix.
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Table 5: Structural Estimation of the Habit Formation Model
Habit Model a la Habit Model a la
Constantinides (1990) Abel (1990)
log(ct − zrt) log(ct)− zlog(rt)
2-type 2-type 3-type 2-type
AR(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameters of Utility Function
Habit formation parameter z 0.45 0.26 0.26 0.92
(.) (.) (0.056) (0.01)
Adjustment speed of reference point N 224.1 240.4 225.6
in days (14.5) (48.1) (18.4)
AR(1) parameter 0.87
(0.07)
Implied half life of AR(1) process 74.03
(42.81)
Discount factor (15 days) δ 0.925 0.903 0.916 0.941
(0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)
Parameters of Search Cost Function
Curvature of search cost γ 0.46 0.60 0.49 0.35
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Search cost for high cost type khigh 144.7 163.7 260.4 391.0
(7.2) (10.2) (154.0) (5.6)
Search cost for medium cost type kmed 74.5
(2.4)
Search cost for low cost type klow 64.9 30.9 13.2 106.7
(2.7) (2.1) (3.0) (9.5)
Share of high cost UI claimant 0.48 0.78 0.21 0.87
(0.080) (0.02) (0.118) (0.01)
Share of low cost UI claimant 0.73
(0.10)
Model Fit
Number of moments used 70 70 70 70
Number of estimated parameters 7 7 9 7
Goodness of Fit 235.7 251.6 220.3 202.8
Notes:
The table shows parameter estimates for the habit-formation model. Estimation is based on
minimum distance estimation, using the hazard rates in the pre- and post-reform periods as
the moments.
Standard errors for estimated parameters in parentheses. The parameter estimates for z in
columns (1) and (2) are not well identiﬁed (i.e. the Hessian cannot be inverted for z close to
the reported values) and therefore we do not provide standard errors for them. The other
standard errors are calculated by inverting the Hessian matrix after dropping z from the
matrix.
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Figure 1: Model Simulations of the Standard and the Reference-Dependent model
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(c) Reference-Dependent Model
Notes: Panel (a) shows two beneﬁt regimes, both of them having a step-down beneﬁt system. After
the ﬁrst step beneﬁts are higher in the regime represented by the circled blue line than in the regime
represented by the red dashed line. After the second step beneﬁts drop to the same level. Panel (b)
shows the hazard rates predicted by the standard model (with k = 130, γ = 0.6, w = 555, δ = 0.99)
while Panel (c) the prediction of the reference-dependent model (with k = 160, γ = 0.6, w = 555,
δ = 0.99, λ = 2, N = 10).
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Figure 2: Beneﬁt Path Change, Main Sample
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the beneﬁt schedule if UI is claimed on October 31, 2005 (old beneﬁt
schedule, dashed blue line) and beneﬁt schedule if UI is claimed on November 1st, 2005 (new beneﬁt
schedule, solid red line) for individuals who had 270 potential duration in the ﬁrst-tier, were less
than 50 years old and earned more than 114,000 HUF ($570) prior to entering UI. A hypothetical
beneﬁt level is shown under social assistance. Beneﬁts levels in social assistance depended on family
income, household size and wealth, which we do not observe these variables in our data.
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Figure 3: Before-After Comparison Groups for Quasi-experiment
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the time frame for which we have access to administrative data on unem-
ployment insurance records, the time of the reform and how we deﬁne the before and after periods
that we use for our before-after comparison. The timing of the reform was the following: those
who claimed UI beneﬁt before February 5th, 2005 faced the old ﬁrst tier schedule and old second
tier schedule; those who claimed beneﬁt between February 5th, 2005 and October 31th, 2005 faced
the old beneﬁt schedule in the ﬁrst tier and the new beneﬁt schedule in the second tier; those who
claimed beneﬁt after November 1st, 2005 faced the new beneﬁt schedule in the ﬁrst tier and the new
beneﬁt schedule in the second tier. To avoid complications caused by changes in the second tier, in
our main speciﬁcations we focus on the (1 year) before sample, i.e. those who claimed UI between
February 5th, 2005 and October 15th, 2005, and (1 year) after sample, i.e. those who claimed UI
between February 5th, 2006 and October 15th, 2006. We use the (2 year) before sample and the (2
year) after sample to show that the changes in the hazard rates are in line with the timing of the
reform. The ﬁrst tier changes before and after October 31th, 2005 are presented in Figure 2. The
changes in the second tier in February 5th, 2005 were the following: potential duration shortened to
180 days above age 50 and to 90 days below that. Before, it was 270 days above age 45 and 180 days
below that. The beneﬁt level was raised slightly from 21,000 HUF ($101) to 22,800 HUF ($114).
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Figure 4: Empirical Hazard and Survival Rates under the Old and the New Beneﬁt
Schedule
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(b) Empirical survival rates
Notes: The ﬁgure shows point wise estimates for the empirical hazards, Panel (a), and for the
empirical survival rates, Panel (b), before and after the reform. The diﬀerences between the two
periods are estimated point-wise at each point of support and diﬀerences which are statistically
signiﬁcant (p ≤ 0.05) are indicated with a vertical bar (green dashed if pre-period hazard is above
post period hazard, red solid otherwise). The three major (red) vertical lines indicate periods when
beneﬁts change in the new system. The sample consists of unemployed workers claiming UI between
February 5th, 2005 and October 15th, 2005 (before sample) and February 5th, 2006 and October
15th, 2006 (after sample), who had 270 days of potential duration, were 25-49 years old, and were
above the 70th percentile of the earnings base distribution of the UI claimants in the given year.
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Figure 5: Robustness Checks for change of Hazard rates before and after the reform
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(a) Controlling for observable diﬀerences
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(b) Restricted sample
Notes: The ﬁgure shows point wise estimates for the empirical hazards before and after the reform.
The diﬀerences between the two periods are estimated point-wise at each point of support and
diﬀerences which are statistically signiﬁcant are indicated with a vertical bar (green dashed if pre-
period hazard is above post period hazard, red solid otherwise). The three major (red) vertical
lines indicate periods when beneﬁts change in the new system. In Panel (a) we controlled for sex,
age, age square, waiting period (the number of days between job lost and UI claimed), the county
of residence, day of the month UI claimed, education, occupation (1 digit) of the last job, and
log earnings in 2002 and 2003. In Panel (b) in addition to controlling for these control variables
we dropped reemployment bonus claimants and those participating in training programs (after the
reform), see text for the details. The sample is otherwise the same as in Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Interrupted Time Series Analysis of Exit Hazards
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(a) The evolution of the hazard rates between 30 and 150 days
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(b) The evolution of the hazard rates between 210 and 330 days
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the level of the most important hazard rates 6 quarters before and 7
quarters after the reform. Panel (a) shows the seasonally adjusted hazard rates between 30 and 150
days, while Panel (b) shows the seasonally adjusted hazard rates between 210 and 330 days. The
monthly seasonal adjustment of hazard rates takes into consideration the level shift present in the
data in November, 2005. The ﬁgures highlight that the shift in the hazard plots documented earlier
corresponds to the precise timing of the reform. Other sample restrictions are the same as in Figure
4.
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Figure 7: Estimates of the Standard and Reference-dependent Model with Hand-to-
Mouth Consumers
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(a) Standard Model
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(b) Reference-dependent Model
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the empirical hazards and the predicted hazards of the standard and the
reference-dependent model with hand-to-mouth consumers. Panel (a) corresponds to the standard
model with 3 cost types, shown in Table 2 column (1), while Panel (b) corresponds to the reference-
dependent model with 2 cost types shown in Table 2 column (2). The three major (red) vertical
lines indicate periods when beneﬁts change in the new system.
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Figure 8: Benchmark Estimates of the Standard and Reference-Dependent Model
(with Endogenous Savings)
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(a) Standard Model with estimated δ
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(b) Ref. Dep. Model, 2 cost types, estimated δ
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(c) Ref. Dep. Model, 2 cost types, estimated β
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(d) Ref. Dep. Model, no heterog., estimated β
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the empirical hazards and the predicted hazards of the standard and the
reference-dependent model with endogenous savings. Panel (a) corresponds to the standard model
with 3 cost types and estimated δ, shown in Table 3 Column (1). Panel (b) corresponds to the
reference-dependent model with 2 cost types shown in Table 3 Column (2). Panel (c) shows the
reference-dependent model with 2 types but present-bias (βδ-discounting) and estimated β (Table
3 Column 4). Panel (d) shows the reference-dependent model with only 1 type and estimated β
(Table 3 Column 6). The three major (red) vertical lines indicate periods when beneﬁts change in
the new system.
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Figure 9: Alternative Estimates of the Reference-dependent Model
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(a) Reference-Dependent Model, AR(1) update
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(b) Reference-Dependent Model, no gain
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(c) Reference-Dependent Model, no loss utility
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(d) Reference-Dependent Model, estimated η and λ
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the empirical hazards and the predicted hazards of estimates of alternative
versions of the reference-dependent model. Panel (a) shows the reference-dependent model where
the reference point is updated using a AR(1) process (Table 4 column 2). Panel (b) shows the
reference-dependent model without gain (only loss) utility (Table 4 column 3). Panel (c) without
loss (only gain) utility (Table 4 column 4) and Panel (d) shows the reference-dependent model where
both the gain η and the loss part λη are estimated (Table 4 column 7).
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Figure 10: Habit Formation Model
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(a) Habit Model with 2 types (Constantinides 1990)
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(b) Habit Model with 2 types and AR(1) updated ref.
point
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(c) Habit Model with 3 types
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(d) Multiplicative Habit Formation (Abel 1990)
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the empirical hazards and the predicted hazards from estimating habit
formation models (See Table 5). Panels (a) through (c) show the habit formation model of Con-
stantinides (1990). The ﬁrst panel uses the same reference point as our main speciﬁcations for the
reference-dependent model, the second panel uses a reference point that is updated via an AR(1)
process, the third panel allows for 3 types of heterogeneity and the last column uses the multiplicative
functional form of the habit model from Abel (1990).
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Figure 11: Estimates of the Standard Model with Alternative Forms of Heterogeneity
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(a) 4 cost types
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(b) Heterogeneity in Wages
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(c) Heterogeneity in Search Cost Curvature
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Days elapsed since UI claimed
h
a
z
a
rd
 r
a
te
Actual Hazard, Before
Estimated Hazard, Before
Actual Hazard, After
Estimated Hazard, After
(d) Heterogeneity in Search Cost Curvature (γ re-
stricted to ≥ 0.2)
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the empirical hazards and the predicted hazards for estimations of the
standard model under diﬀerent speciﬁcations of heterogeneity (See Table 7). Panel (a) allows for 4
cost types. Panel (b) allows for three diﬀerent types with diﬀerent reemployment wages (calibrated
to match the empirical distribution of reemployment wages). Panel (c) allows for three diﬀerent types
in the elasticity of the cost of job search γ and Panel (d) is the same as Panel (c) but restricting the
γ to be larger or equal than 0.2, which would imply an elasticity of search eﬀort with respect to the
returns to job search of less than 5.
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Figure 12: Sensitivity to small changes in beneﬁt path and out-of-sample perfor-
mance of models
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(a) Simulated hazard path for reducing welfare level
to 90%
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(b) Simulated hazard path for increasing welfare level
to 110%
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Days elapsed since UI claimed
h
a
z
a
rd
 r
a
te
Actual Hazard
Simulated Hazard, Ref.Dep. 2 cost types, SSE=73.4
Simulated Hazard, Std. 3 cost types, SSE=91.6
Simulated Hazard, Std. 3 gamma types, SSE=130.5
(c) Out-of-sample predictions of models for 2 year prior
to reform and empirical hazard
Notes: The ﬁgures show the sensitivity of the estimated standard model with 3 search elasticity
types (Table 7 column 6 top panel) and the reference-dependent model with 2 cost types (Table 3
column 2) to changes in the beneﬁt path. Panel a) shows the estimated hazard rates in the pre-
and post-reform periods. In addition it shows the simulated hazard rates from the two models if
the level of welfare beneﬁts (which start after 360 days) is reduced to 90 percent of the actual level.
Panel b) shows the same but for the counterfactual of increasing the beneﬁt level to 110 percent.
Panel c) show the empirical and simulated hazard rates and for the period 2 to 1 years before the
reform when unemployment assistance could be claimed until 460 days.
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Figure 13: Changes in Heterogeneity throughout the Unemployment Spell: Empirical
Heterogeneity vs. Model Predictions
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(a) Predicted total unemployment duration of individuals ex-
iting at time t: Heterogeneity in cost levels k
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Days elapsed since UI claimed
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 l
e
n
g
th
 o
f 
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
Before, STD
After, STD
Before, Ref Dep
After, Ref Dep
Before, Empirical
After, Empirical
(b) Predicted total unemployment duration of individuals ex-
iting at time t: Heterogeneity in search cost curvature γ
Notes: The ﬁgure shows estimates of the expected nonemployment duration of individuals who
left unemployment in each time period, contrasting the empirically observed selection with the
predicted selection from the estimated standard and reference-dependent models. The empirical
expected nonemployment duration (lines with x’s) for each individual is calculated as the predicted
values from a regression of nonemployment duration on observable characteristics at the time of
entering unemployment (see Web Appendix Table WA-1). The expected nonemployment durations
predicted by the estimated standard (3 type) and reference dependent (2 type) model are displayed
as the dashed and solid lines (from Table 3 in Panel a) and from Table 7 column 6 in Panel b)).
55
Appendix
Table A-1: Robustness to Alternative Speciﬁcations for Utility Function and Estimation Methods
Identity Moments Probability Probability 7 day 30 day
Weighting with Moments Moments time time
Matrix controls Full Cov Not full Cov periods periods
Matrix Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard Model
Discount factor (15 days) δ 0.872 0.918 0.928 0.928 0.968 0.876
(0.008) (0.044) (0.011) (0.011) (0.00) (0.018)
Number of moments used 70 70 70 70 156 36
Number of estimated parameters 7 7 7 7 7 7
Goodness of ﬁt (SSE) 0.0033 187.5 226.1 226.1 414.6 148.19
Reference Dependent Model
Loss aversion λ 4.41 5.68 5.69 5.69 4.55 3.41
(1.81) (1.75) (0.40) (0.41) (2.55) (1.31)
Adjustment speed of reference point N 168.7 154.9 164.5 164.5 194.7 152.1
(16.7) (16.2) (11.3) (11.2) (18.5) (13.8)
Discount factor δ 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
Discount factor β 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.61
(0.32) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.344)
Number of moments used 70 70 70 70 156 36
Number of estimated parameters 7 7 7 7 7 7
Goodness of ﬁt (SSE) 0.0027 143.7 178.1 178.1 367.9 106.5
Notes:
The table shows parameter estimates for the standard and the reference-dependent search model. Estimation is
based on minimum distance estimation, using the hazard rates in the pre- and post-reform periods as the moments.
Standard errors for estimated parameters in parentheses.
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Figure A-1: The UI Beneﬁt Schedule Before and After the 2005 Reform in Hungary
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows monthly UI beneﬁts in the ﬁrst tier under the old rule (blue solid line)
in the ﬁrst 90 days under the new rules (red solid line) and between 91-270 days under the new
rules (red dashed line) as a function of the monthly base salary. The main sample, deﬁned by being
above the 70th percentile of the earnings base distribution of the UI claimants in the given year, is
indicated by the curly brackets.
57
Figure A-2: GDP growth and unemployment rate in Hungary
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the seasonally adjusted GDP growth rate (dashed red line) and the season-
ally adjusted unemployment rate (solid blue) between 2003 and 2008 in Hungary. The major (red)
vertical lines indicate the period we use for the before-after comparison. The data was obtained
from the Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce.
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Figure A-3: Comparison of Hazards over Longer Time Frame
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(a) Comparing the hazards 2 year before and 1 year before
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(b) Comparing the hazards 2 year after and 1 year after
Notes: Panel (a) shows point wise estimates for the empirical hazards for two year before (claimed
beneﬁt between February 5st, 2004 and October 15th, 2004) and one year before (claimed beneﬁt
between February 5th, 2005 and October 15th, 2005) the actual reform. Panel (b) shows point
wise estimates for the empirical hazards for one year after (claimed beneﬁt between February 5th,
2006 and October 15th, 2006) and two years after (claimed beneﬁt between February 5th, 2007
and October 15th, 2007) the actual reform. This graph is censored at 400 days because of data
limitations. The diﬀerences between the two periods are estimated point wise at each point of
support and diﬀerences which are statistically signiﬁcant are indicated with a vertical bar. The
three major vertical lines indicate periods when beneﬁts change in the new system. Other sample
restrictions are the same as in Figure 4 in the main text.
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Figure A-4: Model Fit as Function of Diﬀerent Discount Rates
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(a) Goodness of Fit of Standard and Reference-Dependent model for diﬀerent δ
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(b) Goodness of Fit of Standard and Reference-Dependent model for diﬀerent β
Notes: The ﬁgures shows the goodness of ﬁt statistics for the standard and reference-dependent
model for diﬀerent parameter values for δ (Panel a) and β (Panel b). The standard model is estimated
with 3 types of heterogeneity (in search costs) and the reference dependent model with 2 types of
heterogeneity. Each symbol represents one estimation run. For each set of estimates we also indicate
whether the estimated model features any savings on the side of individuals. The numbers next to
the markers indicate the implied annual discount factor.
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Figure A-5: Model Components for Benchmark Estimates of Standard and Reference-
Dependent Model for the High Cost Type, Part I
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(a) Flow Utility, Standard Model
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(b) Flow Utility, Reference-Dependent
model
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(c) Value of Unemployment, Standard
Model
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(d) Value of Unemployment, Reference-
Dependent model
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the model components for the standard model (estimates shown in column
(1) in Table 3) and for the reference-dependent model (estimates shown in column (2) in Table 3).
Panel (a) and Panel (b) shows the ﬂow utility for the standard model and for the reference-dependent
model, respectively. Panel (c) and Panel (d) shows the value of unemployment for the high cost type
for the standard model and for the reference-dependent model, respectively. Panel (e) shows the
evolution of the reference point in the reference dependent model. The three major (red) vertical
lines indicate periods when beneﬁts change in the new system.
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Figure A-6: Model Components for Benchmark Estimates of Standard and Reference-
Dependent Model for the High Cost Type, Part II
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(b) Value of Employment, Reference-
Dependent model
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(c) Consumption, Standard Model
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(d) Consumption, Reference-Dependent
model
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(e) Assets, Standard Model
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(f) Assets, Reference-Dependent model
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the model components for the standard model (estimates shown in column
(1) in Table 3) and for the reference-dependent model (estimates shown in column (2) in Table
3). Panel (a) and Panel (b) shows the value of employment for the standard model and for the
reference-dependent model, respectively. Panel (c) to (f) show consumption and asset path for the
two models. The three major (red) vertical lines indicate periods when beneﬁts change in the new
system.
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Figure A-7: Robustness Checks I
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(a) Std. Model: Time-varying Search Cost
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(b) Ref. Dep. Model: Time-varying Search Cost
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(c) Std. Model: Estimation without Spikes
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(d) Ref. Dep. Model: Estimation without Spikes
Notes: The ﬁgures shows estimates of the standard and reference-dependent model with search
costs being a linear function of time (Panel a and b) or when we estimate the model not using the
sharp spikes in the exit hazard as moments (Panel c and d). See Table 6 for estimates.
63
Figure A-8: Robustness Checks II
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(a) Std. Model: Delayed Job Starting Date
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(b) Ref. Dep. Model: Delayed Job Starting Date
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(c) Std. Model: 30-Day Hazards
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(d) Ref. Dep. Model: 30-Day Hazards
Notes: The ﬁgures shows estimates of the standard and reference-dependent model when we assume
that jobs start with a 2 week delay (Panel a and b), see Table 6, or when we estimate the model
using 30-day time periods (Panel c and d), see Appendix Table A-1.
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